SUMMARY RECORDS

OF THE PANEL DISCUSSION HELD DURING THE 119th ASSEMBLY IN GENEVA
(October 2008)

on the subject item

"Advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and securing the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty: The role of parliaments"

chosen for debate by the First Standing Committee
(Peace and International Security)
during the 120th Assembly in April 2009 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia):
Advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and securing the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: The role of parliaments

Item 3(a) of the agenda

Panel discussion on the subject to be considered by the First Standing Committee on Peace and International Security during the 120th Assembly in April 2009

Sitting of Tuesday, 14 October
(Morning)

The meeting was called to order at 9.15 a.m. with the President of the First Standing Committee, Mr. T. Boa (Côte d’Ivoire), in the Chair.

The MODERATOR explained that the meeting would consist of an informal debate to prepare for the drafting of the report to be discussed by the First Standing Committee on Peace and International Security during the 120th Assembly of the IPU to be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in April 2009.

Mr. R. PRICE (Australia), Co-Rapporteur, said that there were many challenges facing parliamentarians, not least the global financial crisis and climate change, but there was another potential crisis that was far too often overlooked: the immediate and horrific danger of nuclear weapons. It was fitting and timely that parliaments around the world should take up the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In January 2007, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists had moved the hands of the "Doomsday Clock" two minutes closer to midnight in recognition of the growing danger of nuclear weapons; concerns had focussed on their proliferation, and the possibility that terrorist groups could acquire them. A nuclear attack would devastate the target community and psychologically terrorize the rest of the nation.

The explosion of a nuclear weapon by any actor would have economic, social and environmental consequences too awful to contemplate. In that context it was disappointing that States with nuclear weapons continued to modernize their arsenals. While he welcomed the recent reduction in deployed strategic weapons achieved by the United States and the Russian Federation, those States still possessed the largest nuclear arsenals and were yet to negotiate a successor agreement to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, which was due to expire in 2009. If that situation were to continue beyond the expiry of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in 2012, there would be no binding commitment on either country to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. The doctrine of nuclear deterrents had been eroded to some extent by the emergence of nuclear arms States outside the main power blocks, and by the fact that nuclear arms could not be used against terrorists, but the doctrine remained in place in relations between States, and nuclear weapons underpinned the relationship between the great powers. That situation had become more complicated by the advent of a second nuclear age, in which nuclear weapons were symbolic of State power, legitimacy and status, and by the emergence of some nuclear players also outside the main power blocks who appeared willing to sacrifice their people’s prosperity in order to acquire nuclear weapons. Some analysts had argued that the world was approaching a nuclear tipping point, when States, owing to a variety of factor ranging from energy security to regional status, would proliferate in much greater numbers.

Concerns had been expressed following the rise of global demand for nuclear energy, which while it did not necessarily mean a weapons proliferation threat, did mean that there was a need to limit the spread of proliferation sensitive nuclear technologies, such as uranium enrichment and plutonium repossessing technology, both of which could be used not only to make fuel for nuclear reactors, but also nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Suppliers Group was considering those factors.

It was the responsibility of policy makers to identify the weaknesses in the current Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regime and explore all avenues for achieving a nuclear weapon-free world. In January 2007 it had been encouraging to see four prominent and influential Americans,
George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, urge a renewal of the understanding in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which States that did not already possess nuclear weapons agreed to forego them, and States that did possess them agreed to divest themselves of those weapons over time. William Perry had recently been appointed a member of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, which had been established by the Australian and Japanese Governments, and the other three men would serve as members of the Advisory Board to the Commission. The International Commission would follow up on work done by earlier commissions, including the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. The International Commission would enhance the global efforts to strengthen the NPT by ensuring a successful review conference in 2010. The NPT was at the centre of regional and global nuclear architectures, and had contributed significantly to preventing the runaway nuclear proliferation that had been feared in the 1960s. Current fears of nuclear proliferation had arisen once again, and the international community should renew support for and commitment to the goals of the NPT, particularly in the face of non-compliance. One of the major goals of the NPT was to foster nuclear disarmament, and some progress had been made on that. The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union had led to the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons. Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, each side’s strategic offensive arms had been reduced by more than 40 per cent. Under the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, the United States and the Russian Federation will, by the end of 2010, reduce their deployed strategic nuclear warheads by nearly two thirds from the levels recorded in 2002. A new bilateral agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation should be concluded to ensure the further reduction of their nuclear weapons.

The Australian Government had hoped that the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament would be able to bring a fresh approach to the nuclear debate, and that the Commission could assist in overcoming the lack of political will that was holding up progress on the non-proliferation agenda. It was disappointing that the 2008 International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament had not resulted in a consensus on a work programme, for the twelfth consecutive year. A fissile material cut-off treaty would reinforce the NPT and formalize the moratoria on the production of fissile material for weapons, which were currently being observed by the five recognized nuclear weapons States. Furthermore, such a treaty would enable the ban on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to be extended to States outside the NPT. Further proliferation of nuclear weapons was not in any State’s interests, and he therefore called on those States that were blocking consensus at the Conference on Disarmament to enter into negotiations, on such issues as the potential fissile material cut-off treaty. States could facilitate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT), which should be the immediate disarmament priority of all States.

On the role of parliamentarians in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, he said that the co-Rapporteurs’ draft report contained several suggestions, including the possibility of participating in national delegations of United Nations meetings on non-proliferation issues. Parliamentarians could also urge governments to mobilize resources for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Australian Prime Minister had said that over the past decade the world had not paid adequate attention to disarmament. Parliamentarians must ensure that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament were kept at the forefront of policy agendas, and must use every available opportunity to renew momentum for action.

Mr. J.J. MWIIMBU (Zambia), co-Rapporteur, said that the emergence of new challenges and threats to international security had reinforced the importance of States adhering to their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations, which was important for promoting greater stability of the international legal disarmament base, and bridging legal gaps in respect of non-proliferation that would prevent the emergence of a legal vacuum, new areas of confrontation and a possible arms race. Globalization had increased the need for vigilance in respect of the acquisition or development of weapons of mass destruction. With the rise of transnational terrorism, the international community must also confront the possibility of terrorists obtaining and using those weapons. Government strategies must be multi-dimensional and make full use of the tools available to respond to that challenge. The major treaties on disarmament and non-proliferation, such as the CTBT and the United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), were central to maintaining shared international standards.
There was a need for general and complete disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, and existing disarmament and non-proliferation agreements must be effectively resourced and implemented. A multilateral approach to non-proliferation would provide the best means of countering the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It was important to note that how the world dealt with nuclear weapons would determine whether there was a future, and there was a link between the moral imperative of rejecting such weapons and the survival imperative, since the existence of nuclear weapons rendered the security of humankind increasingly precarious. Discussions on the CTBT were intensifying, and progress was being made towards the universality of the Treaty, which would serve as a catalyst for progress in many nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament processes that were under way. The CTBT was crucial in a world that was witnessing the resurgence of nuclear energy. An increasing number of States were mastering the nuclear fuel cycle, and the decision as to whether to use nuclear energy for peaceful or for weapons purposes would become political and legal rather than a question of technology and knowhow. It was increasingly difficult to establish a legal delineation between prohibited and permitted activities, and a nuclear test provided the last clearly visible barrier between the two.

The entry into force of the CTBT would be an incentive to end the production of fissile material for weapons use, pending the entry into force of a fissile material cut-off treaty, as well as to reduce the stocks of those materials. It would limit the nuclear weapons development abilities of countries without nuclear arsenals, and it would be a catalyst for disarmament. The Treaty provided a firm legal barrier against nuclear testing and would therefore curb the development of new types of nuclear weapons. In that regard it was particularly significant that it was a non-discriminatory instrument. A consensus agreement on the CTBT and its entry into force would be essential to the success of the NPT and its current review process.

Extensive international cooperation was crucial, not only because of the global implications of using nuclear weapons, but also because of the global scope of the market for the various commodities required to make them. Although national legislation alone could not attain the world’s disarmament and non-proliferation goals, individual legislatures had an indispensable role to play in ratifying treaties, enacting legislation to ensure consistency between international obligations and domestic provisions, and overseeing implementation. There were many practical legislative steps by which parliaments could impact the overall culture of weapons acquisition, such as through instituting laws that prohibited government pension fund investments in industries that built nuclear weapons. Parliamentarians were responsible for exercising their oversight function in respect of government budgets and policies on arms.

No single State or institution could cope alone with the threat of nuclear proliferation, and the challenges and complexities it entailed could only be addressed through the broadest degree of international cooperation and interaction. All States should participate in the world’s disarmament endeavour, and continue to contribute to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission’s efforts to prepare for the entry into force of such an important arms control agreement.

The MODERATOR invited the two guest speakers to take the floor.

Mr. T. TÓTH, Executive Secretary, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission, Panellist, said that almost 20 years had passed since the end of the Cold War and the spectre of global nuclear catastrophe, which had defined the international agenda for nearly half a century. While the fear of a nuclear catastrophe was no longer as great as it had been in the past, the threat still remained but the urgency with which it must be countered had lost its grip on the world’s imagination. The current challenge was to raise awareness of the gravity of nuclear dangers and threats that increased every day, and create a consensus on how to tackle them. The responsibility for real and actual progress fell on the parliaments of the world.

The CTBT had been negotiated in record time, in the euphoria following the end of the Cold War and when times had been good for international arms control. The negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction had been completed around the same time. In 1996 the CTBT had been opened for signature and the international community had been on its way to a global ban on testing. The nuclear testing of recent years had underscored the urgent need for the ban. The Treaty still required a further nine ratifications before it had the 44 States parties necessary
to enter into force. Despite the challenges for the Treaty, the CTBTO was continuing with its mission, which was twofold: to promote the entry into force of the Treaty, and to establish a global verification regime to monitor compliance. The Preparatory Commission had been working for over 10 years to make that international monitoring system a reality. In recent years considerable progress had been made. Of the 330 facilities to be built in 90 countries, 250 were already sending Treaty-standard data back to the CTBTO International Data Centre in Vienna. In recent years, the volume of data moving across the system had tripled and the content of the information being supplied to States signatories had doubled. The CTBT set a new standard of transparency for arms control and disarmament, the beneficiaries of which were worldwide: there were 1000 user entities in over 100 countries. The system represented a new democracy in the verification of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. The data collected was proving increasingly useful not only for verification but also for civil and scientific applications, such as the provision of time-efficient information to tsunami warning alert centres. The system was the fastest, most reliable and highest quality data provider to international and national tsunami warning centres. Data provision arrangements had recently been signed with Australia, Japan and The Philippines.

The CTBT venture represented a massive financial and human investment. In 2006, its verification regime had detected a nuclear event in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Both the system and the CTBTO were ready.

The importance of the Treaty lay in its normative as well as its technical capabilities, since its ultimate aim was a ban on all testing, for all people, for all time. Testing was the last technical hurdle to achieving nuclear weapons capabilities, as well as being crucial to refining and improving existing capabilities. With recent signatures, CTBTO had 180 members, and had close to 150 ratifications. The CTBT represented progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and the international community should contemplate the importance of the CTBT entry into force at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Nothing would better demonstrate the international community’s commitment to non-proliferation than the entry into force of the CTBT. The Treaty also had the potential to act as a catalyst in other crucial areas of the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, such as the further reduction of strategic and sub-strategic nuclear weapons and achieving a fissile material cut-off treaty.

The ban on nuclear testing was more necessary than ever before. Nuclear energy was considered to be experiencing a renaissance, which was at the crux of international concerns about energy security and the threat of global warming. The steep annual growth rates forecast by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the next 20 years meant that the international community must consider how it would deal with an increase in nuclear energy, and how it would ensure fair, secure, safe and safeguarded access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. That resurgence would lead to an increased number of countries, institutions and individuals managing a wider array of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle components with a significantly increased quantity of fissile material, which would make it particularly difficult to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities. Developments were such that the decision between nuclear energy for peaceful or weapons purposes would be based on political grounds, rather than technical considerations. The promotion of nuclear energy to address energy security and climate change issues should be accompanied by the non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and with an in-force comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

Although parliaments were different the world over, their common mission was to hold governments to account. They must: do more than observe how the Treaty was brought into force; bring the prohibition of nuclear testing to the attention of governments; and push forward a new consensus on the need to tackle the issue, while working together to find an acceptable solution. Although the world was enjoying nuclear peace in comparison with the lows of the Cold War, over the past 10 years gaps had developed in the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Those holes must be filled. The CTBT was the last and most visible legal and technical barrier to the development of nuclear weapons, and was essential for non-proliferation and disarmament. The Treaty could protect the Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regime as the international community deal with the compound challenges facing the world in the twenty-first century. Those challenges must not be left unattended, but rather must be regulated and faced promptly, decisively and collectively. The Treaty was within the international community’s reach.

Mr. A. WARE, Global Coordinator, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Panellist, said that the draft report highlighted the real dangers of nuclear weapons and the lack of international attention given to those weapons. After the end of the Cold War policy makers,
the media and civil society had turned their attention to other issues, thinking that the threat of nuclear proliferation had dissipated. Unfortunately, that was not the case, and over the past 10 years three additional countries had confirmed their nuclear capacity by testing nuclear weapons, a black market in nuclear technology had been developed, nuclear fuel cycle facilities had been expanded, strategic doctrines had broadened to include the threat or use of nuclear weapons in a greater variety of circumstance, and a pre-emptive or preventive use of force doctrine had been developed in response to suspected nuclear weapons programmes.

There was increased evidence of the environmental risks posed by nuclear weapons. Recent simulations using computer modelling had demonstrated that the heat from nuclear explosions would throw dust into the stratosphere, where it would remain for ten times longer than previously estimated. A small exchange of 50 to 100 nuclear weapons would cause disastrous climate change and destroy the earth’s capacity to produce food crops. Those simulations would not be cause for alarm if it was certain that nuclear weapons would never be used. Robert MacNamara, the United States Secretary of Defence during the Cuban Missile Crisis, had said that nuclear deterrence was inherently unstable, and only good luck had prevented a nuclear disaster. While during the Cuban Missile Crisis the authorities had a period of 13 days to address the complexities, uncertainties and miscommunications between sides, nowadays there would only be 13 minutes. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists had moved the hands of their “Doomsday Clock” to 5 minutes to midnight, owing to the growing threat of nuclear weapons use and the problem of climate change. Parliamentarians had a vital role to play in raising the issue of the danger of nuclear weapons in parliaments and in their constituencies, in order to prompt political action. The attention on nuclear weapons should be as prominent as that on global climate change.

Although under the NPT nuclear weapon States were obliged to negotiate for nuclear disarmament, they had instead followed a counter-proliferation policy, deeming themselves to be responsible enough to keep their arsenals while preventing others from acquiring nuclear weapons. That policy had not been effective, and had led former high-level nuclear weapon advocates to urge a shift from policies to control proliferation to policies to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. Policy makers had a crucial role to play in that regard. The draft report had identified three important steps for a nuclear weapons-free world: the entry into force of the CTBT, the adoption of a fissile material cut-off treaty, and further agreed reductions in stockpiles. Parliamentarians could act to make those steps a priority for their governments. The establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones was an important step. There were 113 countries in nuclear weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Pacific, South East Asia, Africa and Central Asia. Parliamentarians had played a crucial role in promoting negotiations to achieve those zones, and were working to promote such zones in other regions. National legislation in New Zealand and Mongolia criminalized nuclear weapons activities, and made it illegal for government agents to be involved in nuclear weapons activities anywhere in the world. Norway had divested government pension funds from corporations involved in the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. With those ideas, the draft report provided a good basis for consideration of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Thus far, however, the report did not address the identification of weaknesses in the Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regime, or explore all avenues for a nuclear weapons-free world.

Some of the key weaknesses in the Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regime included the fact that the NPT had been unable to prevent non-ratifying States, such as India, Israel and Pakistan from developing a nuclear weapons capability; the NPT was powerless to prevent a non-nuclear weapon State from gaining nuclear technology assistance within the Treaty and then withdrawing from the Treaty and using the technology to develop nuclear weapons; and the NPT had been unable to enforce the obligation for nuclear weapon States to negotiate for nuclear disarmament. The NPT was a discriminatory treaty, which provided a privileged position to five members: the States that had tested nuclear weapons before 1970. All non-nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT were obliged not to possess or acquire nuclear weapons, and to submit all nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards, while the nuclear weapon States were not required to comply with those measures. That discriminatory aspect had prevented India and Pakistan from adhering to the NPT, since they would have been obliged to accept non-nuclear weapon State requirements.

Although the CTBT was not as discriminatory in its legal requirements, it was still problematic, since it did not prohibit all nuclear testing, but only nuclear explosions. The more technically advanced countries such as the United States, France and the Russian Federation no longer used explosive testing, since they had developed sub-critical testing, fusion experiments and super-computer simulations.
The proposed fissile material cut-off treaty also caused problems, since nuclear weapons States would only agree to the prohibition of the production of fissile materials and not the destruction of existing stockpiles. France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States had large stockpiles of fissile materials and would therefore be able to replenish their nuclear weapons far into the future, even if the treaty was concluded. Other countries were resisting the treaty, since they had smaller stockpiles of fissile materials. Neither the CTBT nor the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty, nor reductions in stockpile numbers addressed the issue of policies of threat and use of nuclear weapons and maintenance of nuclear capacity to be able to realize those threats. A comprehensive approach to nuclear abolition and non-proliferation was therefore required, and that view had been expressed by many influential bodies and people around the world, including prominent politicians, the International Court of Justice and the United Nations General Assembly.

In order to explore the feasibility of complete nuclear disarmament, a model nuclear weapons convention had been drafted and submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and to the Conference of States Parties to the NPT. It had been supported by parliamentarians from around the world. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission had expressed the view that it would be possible to achieve a nuclear weapons convention, and that preparatory work in that regard should be undertaken by the nuclear weapons States. In July 2008, Members of the European Parliament had issued a declaration endorsing a nuclear weapons convention. Given those developments, the revised report should include some information on and analysis of the growing consensus on the need for a comprehensive approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and in particular the prospects for a nuclear weapons convention and the role of parliamentarians in that regard. Parliamentarians had played a key role in developing the political momentum to achieve treaties prohibiting chemical weapons, biological weapons, landmines and cluster munitions, and to achieve nuclear weapons-free zones and the CTBT. They could generate similar political will for a treaty to prohibit and eliminate the most destructive of all weapons on earth. The abolition of nuclear weapons would not only free the world from one of the key threats to human survival, it would also open doors to the international cooperation required to solve other key global problems such as poverty and environmental degradation. He urged all parliamentarians to become actively involved in that process.

Debate

Ms. M. WILSON (New Zealand) reiterated New Zealand’s support for nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which were concepts that underpinned New Zealand’s foreign policy. It was important for parliamentarians to make the maximum possible effort to contribute to the promotion of a nuclear free world. The issue of nuclear disarmament had been put on the back burner and therefore needed to be refreshed and given a greater sense of urgency. One of the main difficulties was the need to seek a comprehensive, non-discriminatory approach. It was also important to ensure that the efforts to promote ratification of the CTBT were not forgotten. Increased cooperation between parliaments, the IPU and the United Nations was essential, not only because of the global implications of the use of nuclear weapons, but also because of the global scope of weapons commodities markets, which must not be forgotten. Parliamentarians must ensure that those issues were addressed in their national policies and legislation, and they must also aid other countries. In order to support the work of the parliaments and the IPU, the support of the people was imperative, and efforts were required to increase public awareness, information and advocacy.

Mr. A. LARIJANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that disarmament and non-proliferation were among the most serious issues of the contemporary world, and could only be advanced through joint efforts and cooperation between all nations, and increased dedication of parliaments around the world. There were currently around 27,000 nuclear warheads in the arsenals of a few countries; those quantities would be sufficient to destroy the planet several times over. Many tonnes of highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium were available in stocks that could easily be turned into weapons. While those weapons existed and article 6 of the NPT was not given sufficient attention, the international community would not have peace and tranquillity. In recent years the situation had deteriorated. No progress had been made in nuclear disarmament, and the use of weapons with depleted uranium in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, along with Cold War-minded strategies, had increased the danger of nuclear weapons at the beginning of the twenty first century.
The international community had the right to be assured that disasters like those that had occurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki would never happen again. Nuclear weapons were as illegal as chemical and biological weapons. In the Middle East, nuclear weapons and activities under the safeguard agreement, relating to the Zionist regime, were a source of concern and constituted a threat to international peace and security. That was the only regime that had not accepted the NPT and had refused to place its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards, despite being rewarded by certain western countries. Over the years, the double standards applied by the United States to the implementation of international treaties had undermined those treaties and had encouraged other States to pursue nuclear weapons, such as the favour that had been shown towards the Zionist regime and some other countries in the region. Although the United States had nuclear weapons and was not party to the NPT, it had entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with those States. The double standards had resulted in the unjust and unlawful treatment of the peaceful nuclear activities in Iran. The United States could be under a false illusion that in such an atmosphere they could force countries to choose between either being deprived of NPT benefits despite acting in line with the NPT or being exempt from NPT obligations by pledging their alliance to the United States. Consideration should be given to how the attitude of the United States affected decision making in other countries. Practice showed that countries differentiated between the kind words of the United States and its brutal and deceptive behaviour.

The Islamic Republic of Iran had stated unequivocally that weapons of mass destruction had no place in its defence doctrine, and had made many proposals for building mutual confidence, but action in the United Nations Security Council had only served to complicate the negotiation process. The political motivations of certain States were resulting in attention being diverted away from nuclear disarmament, and States being denied the right to conduct peaceful nuclear activities. The time had come to review non-compliance with NPT and establish new order in that regard.

Mr. S.C. NEMBANG (Nepal) said that nuclear weapons, wherever they existed and whoever possessed them, could cause unprecedented destruction to humanity. States must pledge to end nuclear weapons production, stop proliferation and destroy nuclear weapons stockpiles. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament should constitute an international dialogue priority in United Nations disarmament forums and in other international bodies. It was deeply concerning that the world was threatened by nuclear technology getting into the hands of non-State actors such as terrorists. That threat required concerted action to prevent access to nuclear weapons. The IPU embodied the aspirations of the world’s population: parliamentarians were the representatives of civil society, and in that capacity should respect the desire of the people to live in peace and security. The IPU had the capacity and legitimacy to influence the policy decisions of States on nuclear non-proliferation. Collective will and determination could increase global adherence to the NPT and increase ratification of the CTBT.

As a State party to the NPT, Nepal had consistently pursued the policy of total and general disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. Nepal was a signatory to the CTBT and Parliament was in the process of preparing to ratify that Treaty. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Kathmandu supported national disarmament efforts, which were crucial to stopping the arms race, relieve tensions, and release precious resources to deliver much needed government dividends to the people and contribute to the realization of the MDGs. An historic democratic political transformation in Nepal meant that the country was on the path to peace, democracy and development. The State’s priorities included ensuring a logical conclusion to the peace process, drafting a democratic constitution, and speeding up the socio-economic transformation. He hoped that increased support from the international community would enable Nepal to meet those priorities.

Mr. A.F. SOROUR (Egypt) said that nuclear proliferation and testing constituted a threat to civilization. Many countries had developed nuclear weapons outside the boundaries of United Nations control, and there was evidence of a secret market in nuclear weapons, and disarmament efforts were slowing down. It was crucial for India, Israel and Pakistan to ratify the NPT. The CTBT was crucial for establishing a nuclear weapons-free world, since it represented remarkable progress for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Although Egypt had signed the CTBT in 1996, it had not yet ratified the treaty, and the co-Rapporteurs should amend the draft report to that effect. The Egyptian President was calling for the Middle East to become a nuclear weapons-free zone, and Egypt would not ratify the Treaty until Israel acceded to the NPT. The major nuclear powers that called for the respect of human rights were the first to violate those rights by conducting nuclear tests and developing their nuclear arsenals. Members of Parliament must call for fairness and respect for those human rights, and
refuse to ratify treaties that major States had not yet ratified or even respected. Egypt wanted to see the Middle East become a nuclear weapons-free zone. States that claimed to advocate the protection of human rights must be the first to respect the need for nuclear disarmament.

Mr. P. MARTIN-LALANDE (France) said that parliamentarians must ensure that the NPT was respected in light of new challenges and threats, particularly by strengthening the non-proliferation regime in view of the proliferation crises in Iran and North Korea. The international community must respond appropriately to the increasing demand for civilian uses of nuclear energy, given the increasing fragility of global energy supplies. The Iranian nuclear crisis was one of the most serious crises facing the international community, which was threatening stability in the Middle East and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Disarmament Regime. Iran had conducted a secret nuclear programme for over 20 years, and had developed enrichment activities without any clearly identified civilian use. The IAEA, after five years of inquiry, was still unable to guarantee the civilian objective of the Iranian programme. The peaceful use of nuclear energy could only be applied in the context of the NPT. In accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, Iran must renew its dialogue, and suspend its activities connected with enrichment and processing, in order to achieve a negotiated solution that responded to the needs and expectations of the international community.

Nuclear disarmament should be a collective commitment. France had led the way and continued to contribute to disarmament, with the intention of reducing its nuclear arsenal by one third. France’s plan of action included the application of the CTBT by dismantling nuclear test sites in an open and transparent manner, participating in negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, establishing an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material, opening negotiations on a treaty banning ground to ground missiles. India, Israel and Pakistan should commit to the non-proliferation regime. France was committed to seeing the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, and a solution to the Iranian crisis would be crucial to progress in that regard.

Mr. M. AL-HULWAH (Saudi Arabia) said that the Kingdom and people of Saudi Arabia were committed to non-proliferation, peace and international security. Saudi Arabia had ratified the NPT and was committed to eliminating all weapons of mass destruction. There were over 26,000 nuclear warheads in circulation, which represented a major threat to civilization; 95 per cent of which belonged to the United States and the Russian Federation. Both those States were members of the United Nations Security Council and thus were responsible for global security. Weapons of mass destruction were falling into the hands of Israel, a State with expansionist aims in the Middle East, and that situation was leading to political destabilization in the region. There was increasing fear that still others could obtain nuclear weapons and use them to violate international security and human rights. The international community was putting pressure on Iran, which was developing nuclear energy for human needs. If the international community put the same pressure on Israel, which had developed nuclear weapons, dialogue in the region might be more balanced. Disarmament efforts must focus on all weapons, in particular weapons of mass destruction, and on enabling developing countries to establish a nuclear capacity for civilian purposes, in order to ensure renewable energy resources for their populations.

Mr. C. YILMAZ (Turkey) said that Turkey was monitoring closely all developments in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and was participating in collective efforts to reverse the alarming trend of nuclear proliferation. Turkey had signed and ratified the CTBT, which was a fundamental instrument in support of the NPT and urged all States that had not ratified CTBT to do so as soon as possible, in order for it to enter into force. It would be very difficult to succeed in the implementation of the CTBT and the NPT without a clear vision for disarmament and a nuclear weapons-free world. The issue of peaceful and non-peaceful use of nuclear technologies was increasingly being approached as a political issue, rather than a technical issue. He wondered whether it was really possible to differentiate between peaceful and non-peaceful development of nuclear technologies.

Mr. B. BOUTOUIGA (Algeria) said that the report should focus on the balanced and global implementation of NPT on three pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful means, all of which were indivisible. It should also focus on the right of non-nuclear weapons States to benefit from the assistance of countries that had experience in the development of civilian nuclear power, so that they could increase their access to that energy source. The prevention of nuclear proliferation should not be used as a pretext for preventing developing
countries from benefitting by having gained access to nuclear technology for peaceful means. The report should also give due attention to the right of non-nuclear weapons States to be protected against all threats of use of nuclear weapons against them, and the need to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East by bringing an end to double standards and tackling the issue of Israel’s nuclear capacities. Africa, Asia and Latin America, had already established nuclear weapons-free zones, but the Middle East had not succeeded in that regard, despite the fact that it was the most volatile in terms of peace and international security.

Mrs. M. KANEVA (Bulgaria) said that the debate in the 2008 United Nations General Assembly should be taken into consideration. The draft report could be further improved by adding more information on the interdependence between nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, which complemented and enhanced each other, and were both integral to the achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world. The final report and the draft resolution should mention the International Court of Justice decision of 1996 on the use of nuclear weapons, which had stated that all States were obliged to conduct in good faith and conclude negotiations for nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control. The report should deplore the fact that the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit had ignored the question of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Efforts should be made to adopt legally binding acts to provide adequate security guarantees for non-nuclear weapons States. The report should mention the further establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones as a means of preventing proliferation and ensuring regional and global security. It would be pertinent to mention the right of States that fulfilled their obligations under the NPT to full access to nuclear energy for peaceful uses. All States should make provisions in their national legislation to prevent terrorists from accessing nuclear weapons and materials and technologies for the production of nuclear weapons. In that regard, the report should call for the strict observance of Resolution No. 1540 of the United Nations Security Council. The report should stress the need for the more active involvement of parliaments in the participation of States in United Nations activities, and should propose some specific IPU activities for the promotion of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Mr. H. CHARALAMBOUS (Greece) said that it seemed somewhat irrational that countries still possessed nuclear weapons that were capable of destroying the planet, and that instead of committing resources to destroying those weapons, those countries were more interested in controlling or interfering with the efforts of other countries to develop nuclear energy for development purposes. While the NPT and CTBT were steps in the right direction, they alone were insufficient to change the situation, particularly since some States refused to ratify the CTBT. All pacifists should work together to fight for the elimination of nuclear weapons, in order to be certain that there would never be another nuclear holocaust such as had taken place in Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

While billions of dollars were being spent to develop new, more destructive weapons, sufficient funds were not available to eliminate famine, poverty, infant and child mortality, or to provide access to sanitation, medicines and the eradication of endemic diseases such as malaria. The money spent on developing nuclear weapons could be better spent for research into diseases like HIV, which killed millions of people each year. Greece was in favour of the complete destruction of all nuclear weapons, and urged that weapons funds should be used to improve the quality of human life.

Ms. Y. REHMAN (Pakistan) said that despite nuclear weapon States having substantially reduced their arsenals, nuclear disarmament remained an elusive objective. Recent trends had witnessed a progressive erosion of international arms control and non-proliferation structures, owing to a number of factors: the disavowal by most of the NPT nuclear weapon States of their disarmament commitments; the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; the prolonged non-entry into force of the CTBT; prospects of new tests by some States; the emergence of doctrines envisaging the use of nuclear weapons, even against non-nuclear weapon States; plans to develop usable nuclear weapon; the promotion of selective non-proliferation; discriminatory conditions for peaceful nuclear cooperation; growing asymmetry in military power among States; and the danger of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and other non-State actors. International peace and security were therefore under grave threat.

While the draft report had rightly concluded that all States must have the political will to comply with treaties on non-proliferation, it had not analysed the reasons for the lack of progress in arms control and disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament, which was the sole multilateral negotiating body for disarmament treaties, was at an impasse. The proposals that had been presented to the
Conference in 2007 and 2008 had negated the principle of equal security for all, while serving the interest of a few States and undermining the basis of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty. Total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only guarantee for durable peace and security for all, and the most effective and credible way to stop the nuclear arms race was through transparent, irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament. States could enable the Conference on Disarmament to address all the priority issues on its agenda by demonstrating the political will to promote the objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation. In that regard, Pakistan supported the negotiation of a verifiable treaty on fissile material, and had always been against the introduction of nuclear weapons in the region and beyond. Pakistan had not been the first to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia, and had been compelled, in 1998, to respond to other States in order to restore the strategic balance in the region. Since 1998, as a nuclear weapon State, Pakistan had consistently upheld its commitments in terms of restraint and responsibility.

Pakistan’s proposal to establish a strategic restraint regime in South Asia encompassed conflict resolution, nuclear and missile restraint and conventional balance. Policies that created nuclear disparities in South Asia and strengthened the discriminatory approach to Pakistan could only contribute to exacerbating strategic asymmetries that would destabilize the whole region and encourage further proliferation. A level playing field was required for the peaceful use of nuclear energy under appropriate safeguards through an objective, non-discriminatory criteria-based approach. Her delegation agreed that parliaments had a crucial role to play in the prevention and cessation of the nuclear arms race, and that they must urge their governments to fulfil their obligations under treaties to which they were party, promote negotiation of non-discriminatory regimes and raise awareness through parliamentary debates on those issues.

Ms. M. RAUCH-KALLAT (Austria) said that Austria attached the utmost importance to the early entry into force of CTBT. As a host country of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, and as co-Chair with Costa Rica of the Article XIV Conference, Austria was doing its best to accelerate the ratification process. That country appreciated the efforts of the Provisional Technical Secretariat, particularly with regard to the establishment of a global verification regime. Austria was actively contributing to accelerating the CTBT ratification process, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, which could become the second region after Europe to ratify the CTBT, and thus send a very strong signal to other continents. Austria had financed a workshop to promote the signature and ratification of the CTBT in the Caribbean in 2007, and had supported several regional information events. The Bahamas and Barbados had recently ratified the Treaty, and Colombia’s recent ratification was major step forward. Recent positive dynamics should be used to further strengthen endeavours to promote the Treaty’s entry into force. Along with Costa Rica and a group of friends of the CTBT, Austria had organized a ministerial meeting during the 2008 United Nations General Assembly to confirm the commitment of ratifying States to the early entry into force of the CTBT. Austria had also helped organize a regional conference in San Jose, Costa Rica, to further promote ratification in the region.

Mr. S.S. AL SUWAIDI (United Arab Emirates) said that nuclear weapons proliferation constituted a major danger to world peace and security. Particular consideration should be given to the right of all countries to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the need to apply equal standards to all States with respect to weapons of mass destruction, the importance of ensuring that the Middle East became free of weapons of mass destruction – in particular through Israel’s accession to the CTBT, the need to establish an international network of parliamentarians to verify the nuclear weapons ban, and the importance of codifying all aspects of nuclear weapons production and verification systems for weapons of mass destruction. The role of parliaments should be strengthened by establishing laws on nuclear issues. The proliferation of nuclear testing should be prohibited through legislation.

Mr. JIN SHENGGUAN (China) said that in the context of the current international security situation, non-proliferation and disarmament constituted both an opportunity and a challenge, and different parties had different views on how to proceed. China believed that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually strengthening. Parliaments around the world could contribute to non-proliferation and disarmament. Efforts should be made to establish a new security concept based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination. Global challenges should be addressed through multinational cooperation for the security of all countries. In that regard, commitment to achieving global strategic stability was particularly important. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals have a particular responsibility. The CTBT had an important role to play in the promotion of non-proliferation,
and received China’s full support. The Chinese Government had established a national body to prepare for the implementation of the Treaty, and had participated in the work of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.

Mr. D. DAWSON (Canada) said that Canada supported the CTBT and despite the fact that 179 countries had signed the Treaty, it could not enter into force until the 44 States possessing nuclear technology had ratified it. Of those States, nine had still not ratified the Treaty. Canada, as one of those 44 States, had ratified the Treaty in December 1998. The CTBT remained a crucial piece of unfinished business on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. It was an integral part of a rules-based, multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, which constrained the ability of States to develop new nuclear weapons, and prevented nuclear weapon States from increasing their arsenals. The verification system had been implemented provisionally by the CTBTO and had demonstrated its effectiveness in detecting suspected nuclear weapons test explosions all over the world. Furthermore, the Treaty’s International Monitoring System collected data that was applied to new civil scientific applications, as well as compliance verification. Canada played an active role in encouraging other States to ratify the Treaty, in order to ensure its entry into force and the completion of the International Monitoring System. All States would benefit from the entry into force of the CTBT, since it would constitute a major step towards a safer and more secure world. His delegation therefore called on all States to ratify the Treaty without further delay.

Mr. A. RAZZI (Italy) said that during the Second World War, two nuclear weapons had resulted in the deaths of 110,000 people. The world’s leaders shouldered an enormous responsibility: to ensure that such tragedies did not occur again in future. After the Second World War, Italy had included a provision in its Constitution condemning the use of war as a solution to international conflict. Parliamentary democracy could play an important role in abolishing war, firstly by abolishing nuclear weapons, which were the most dangerous weapons that threatened the very existence of humanity. Parliaments could encourage those who had not yet done so to ratify the CTBT, and bring pressure to bear on governments to facilitate the entry into force of the CTBT. Efforts should be made to investigate the possibilities of renewable energy sources, such as geothermal energy, and conservation efforts were required to ensure optimum economic use of the energy resources that were currently available. Scientific research could make resources available that were not connected with weapons production. A clear distinction should be made between nuclear energy production for civilian use and military use, in order to end suspicion and ensure full control. Research should be conducted into new forms of energy, which were separate from the production of nuclear weapons. Efforts should be made to destroy existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, with a view to establishing nuclear weapons-free zones in South East Asia and the Middle East.

Mr. L. TAPELA (Zimbabwe) said that since the ultimate beneficiary of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was the people, parliaments had a crucial role to play. Members of Parliament must help to explain nuclear issues to the electorate, since many people had no direct experience of nuclear weapons, and thought that nuclear science was beyond their comprehension. Concrete action at the level of State policy was shaped and influenced in diverse ways by an informed public. Parliamentarians in nuclear weapon States had an essential role to play in promoting nuclear disarmament through collaborative non-partisan efforts to mobilize support among their constituents and build the political will of politicians to take steps for the global prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, including through ratification of the CTBT. Parliamentarians could play a key role in promoting the establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones, and to ensure that the NPT review conference was considered at the highest political level. Law makers should recognize the potential of nuclear power to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, as well as to combat climate change. They must therefore ensure that all nuclear energy was used for peaceful activities only. Members of Parliament should start deliberations on a global treaty for the elimination of nuclear weapons under international control. They could also promote the end of regional and intercontinental conflicts, which had led to delayed ratification of the CTBT. In their budget allocation function, parliamentarians should ensure that responsible parties fulfilled their financial obligations in respect of monitoring and disarmament. A lot of favourable words had been said and treaties signed, but the time had come for members of parliament to give those words some backbone and push States to come up with real, irreversible, verifiable, transparent and timely actions. The entry into force of the CTBT would be a step forward that should be combined with the adoption of a nuclear weapons treaty, in order to make the world nuclear weapons free and secure.
Mr. S.H. YOON (Republic of Korea) said that while Mr. Price had said that parliamentary diplomacy had been instrumental in reducing the diplomatic isolation that hindered international efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, the many visits of parliamentarians from a number of countries had not persuaded North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions. North Korea had been trying to develop more sophisticated nuclear arsenals and delivery systems. He wondered what could be done to develop a specific strategy for dealing with countries like North Korea that appeared to be adamant about retaining and developing their nuclear capacities.

Mr. V.I.D. UNGUREANU (Romania) said that the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540, which prevented non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, still required considerable efforts at the national, regional and international levels. Parliamentarians should therefore adopt the necessary legislation and ensure that governments cooperated fully with the Committee that had been established under that resolution; they should also use all budgetary and supervisory methods available in that regard. Particular attention should be given to the interdependence between nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and the environment. Any weaknesses in nuclear storage sites could have devastating environmental consequences. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament should be made a priority on parliamentary agendas, and consideration should be given to capacity building in that regard. More structured cooperation between the IPU and the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament should be foreseen.

Mr. V. LIKHACHEV (Russian Federation) said that many delegations had mentioned the problems of nuclear disarmament, which included the issue of translating the principles of State obligations into international law. States should be entitled to have access to nuclear energy for peaceful means, provided that they respected the provisions of the NPT and CTBT. A global infrastructure should be developed to assist countries using nuclear power for peaceful purposes, and an international centre for nuclear energy should be established. Efforts should be made to assist the IAEA in fulfilling its role. The Russian Federation respected all of its obligations in that regard, and had entered into negotiations with the United States for the establishment of legally binding agreements on national security. Disarmament negotiations were also underway on an international agreement for the elimination of stocks of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Talks were ongoing on the prohibition of fissile material production, and should include all countries with capacities in that regard. The next NPT Review Conference would be held in 2010. The IPU could prepare a balanced document written from the perspective of international moral standards and international law, and send a delegation to the Review Conference to present the joint views of the world’s parliamentarians.

Mr. S. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said that it was crucial for the Middle East to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and for the region to become free of those weapons. It was therefore essential to ensure the implementation of the NPT, the States parties to which were entitled to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Middle East was one of the most sensitive regions in the world. Any party that refused inspection could be very dangerous. In that regard, Israel was not subject to any inspections for weapons proliferation. He called on all parliamentarians to work to establish effective national regimes to supervise States’ use of nuclear weapons and technologies. Any violations of States’ obligations with respect to their nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament responsibilities should be punished. Countries that prevented others from obtaining nuclear technologies had the greatest stocks of missiles. In that regard, while Israel refused to ratify the NPT, the Islamic Republic of Iran was being prevented from developing nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. Such double standards were unacceptable and must be stopped in order for international instruments on non-proliferation and disarmament to be respected.

Mr. O. BILORUS (Ukraine) said that nuclear disarmament was one of the key strategic imperatives of the twenty first century, which was crucial to global and national development. A nuclear-free world was the main precondition for international security. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had been the third nuclear power in the world with a nuclear arsenal of around 1,500 missiles and 1.2 million military personnel that had been reduced to 120,000 men. The country had been the first to embark on an initiative for full nuclear self-disarmament, an example that all other nuclear weapon States should follow. As a result of that initiative, Ukraine was no longer a global nuclear target. It had been able to divert billions of dollars to national development and had a State programme for peaceful nuclear energy. Parliaments should play a lead role in disarmament initiatives and in controlling strategies for national development.
Mrs. B. BAIMAGAMBETOVA (Kazakhstan) said that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was a particularly painful subject for Kazakhstan, since it had been the victim of destruction caused by nuclear weapons and knew how terrifying the consequences of nuclear testing could be. Over the past century, over 2000 nuclear tests had taken place in the world, around a quarter of which had been conducted on Kazakh territory. The Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site had taken the health and lives of 1.5 million people, whose children and grandchildren were still suffering the consequences. The site had led to unthinkable environmental consequences, with vast expanses of land having been exposed to radiation. Following independence, the President of Kazakhstan had taken an important and wise decision to renounce the colossal nuclear arsenal that Kazakhstan had inherited from the former Soviet Union. The country had voluntarily closed that site, the second largest nuclear testing site in the world. The consequences of the use of nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan for Central Asia and the world were still unknown. The country was committed to supporting the expansion of nuclear weapons-free zones. The Kazakh Parliament had ratified all the relevant instruments on non-proliferation, controlling weapons and strengthening national security. Kazakhstan was a peace-loving State, which was establishing internal conditions for national development. The IPU should ensure that the experience of countries such as Kazakhstan was used for the benefit of others.

Mr. R. LEÓN (Chile) said that the role of parliamentarians was to encourage governments to engage in the peaceful use of nuclear technology, and sanction those that were not transparent in that process. In Latin America, countries that did not meet their commitments under the NPT should be sanctioned. States that had not ratified the NPT should be excluded from the present meeting and other, similar future meetings. It was pointless discussing the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation while countries continued to flout the regime. Despite dictatorships in Latin America, the use and development of nuclear weapons had always been controlled. Measures should be taken to ensure that the issue of nuclear disarmament was not merely the subject of international debate, but also that of practical measures being taken to ensure its implementation.

Baroness MILLER OF CHILTHORNE DOMER (United Kingdom) said that the report would provide a strong foundation for drafting the resolution. The goal of the international community should be to conclude an international nuclear weapons convention to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Parliamentarians, as a priority, should set a timetable to meet that goal. The report mentioned the need for the IPU to reinvigorate political will to comply with existing treaties. That will had been lacking, and those treaties had not resulted in the progress expected. Parliamentarians from nuclear weapon States should press for a reduction and the development of verification methods. The United Kingdom was facing a critical decision on whether to renew its trident weapons system. Parliamentarians from non-weapon States had an equally important role to play in expanding non-nuclear weapons regions and holding weapon States to account for the non-fulfilment of their obligations. Parliamentarians had a key role to play in bringing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament back to the forefront of political discussion.

Mr. A.J. RICHARD RIOT (Malaysia) said that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament remained a high priority for Malaysia. That country had always maintained a principled position on general and complete disarmament of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and was therefore concerned by reports on the development of new, sophisticated nuclear weapons, replacement of old stockpiles and qualitative improvements to existing arsenals. Such retrogressive measures placed the whole of humanity at risk. Malaysia urged all nuclear weapon States to abandon their nuclear doctrines and join the international community’s efforts to construct a new structure of global security through phased reductions of existing nuclear weapons, leading to their total destruction. Malaysia was a co-sponsor to a resolution on the reduction of the operational status of nuclear weapons systems which was before the present session of the United Nations General Assembly. Keeping nuclear weapons on high alert had been a feature of the Cold War. Taking those weapons off high alert would be an immediate and practical step to reduce the risk of nuclear war and enhance the security of all States. Although reductions in the deployment of nuclear weapons had been noted, they could never substitute for the irreversible destruction of stockpiles required for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The de-alerting of the operational status of nuclear weapons systems was a modest and practical approach to nuclear disarmament, which would hopefully lead to the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention.
The NPT continued to set the standard for achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and ensuring international peace and security. Countries that had not yet acceded to the NPT should therefore do so. Malaysia had deposited its ratification instrument for the CTBT on 17 January 2008, thus bringing the number of States parties to the Treaty up to 145. He urged the States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, on which the entry into force of the Treaty depended, to ratify expeditiously. While there was an abundance of ideas on how to propel the disarmament process, a lack of political will was impeding progress. Parliamentarians should help manifest that political will, and must continue to highlight the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in their work. A concerted effort and unwavering commitment were required to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world.

Mr. N. ANASTASIADES (Cyprus) said there was no greater threat to global peace than the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrents played at best a marginal role in preventing those threats. Efforts must be made to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technologies. Strong export controls, better inspections and safeguards, tougher sanctions against violators and more targeted banning efforts were required. Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction must be a policy priority for all. Countries should be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons, and States that possessed nuclear weapons should reduce their reliance on nuclear forces, decrease the size of their arsenals, remove weapons from dangerous alert status and increase security in order to ensure that nuclear weapons would not be stolen or trafficked. The international community should aim to move towards a more inductive inspection system to ensure that States complied with non-proliferation norms. Double standards should therefore be eliminated. Member parliaments of the IPU should urge their governments to sign and ratify non-proliferation and disarmament treaties, proceed with their non-proliferation and disarmament agendas, introduce motions for general debate and develop educational programmes on those issues in order to raise public awareness. All efforts should be made to make a nuclear weapons-free world a realistic target.

Mr. A. ABDULLAH (Palestine) said that the planet faced many dangers, ranging from climate change to the current economic crisis, but more dangerous still was the threat posed by nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. The Middle East was under particular threat, since the Dimona nuclear reactor in Israel was aging and potential leakages were imminent. His delegation called on the international community to force all countries with nuclear weaponry to sign and ratify the NPT, to open their facilities for international inspection and transparency to ensure that they did not represent a threat to neighbouring countries. Nearly 20 years previously, the President of Egypt had called on the international community to make the Middle East a nuclear weapons free zone. That call had not yet been heeded.

Further to the concerns at the regional level, consideration should also be given to threats coming from other parts of the world, such as North Korea. The world community should not limit itself to controlling weaponry, but should also ensure that stockpiles and production equipment were dismantled and that States were thus disarmed. Some nuclear weapons-producing countries were using third countries as a dumping ground for their nuclear waste, which was as much of a threat as nuclear weaponry. He called for an international conference to work towards controlling and dismantling weapons of mass destruction in order to save the planet.

Mr. C.K. CHANDRAPPAN (India) said that nuclear disarmament had been the most critical issue on the disarmament agenda for some time. As one of the main causes of concern for the international community, nuclear proliferation was not limited to new States acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities, but also included the real threat of nuclear materials and weapons falling into the hands of non-State actors, who wanted to further their own agendas. The global stockpile of nuclear weapons was estimated at over 20,000, over half of which was thought to be on high alert. Despite the fact that the international community was convinced that nuclear weapons should never be used, they continued to exist. One of the main reasons for that situation was that existing multilateral regimes had been discriminatory and that disarmament-related provisions had not been observed in letter and spirit. India had consistently maintained a principled position and attached great importance to nuclear disarmament. In 1954, India’s Prime Minister had called for a halt to nuclear testing. In 1965, India had proposed the principles of the NPT: a holistic framework for achieving a nuclear weapons-free world. Now, as a responsible nuclear power, India was mindful of its duty to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction, technologies and materials. While maintaining a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, India continued to be committed to the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world through global, verifiable,
non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. India’s responsible nuclear doctrine was based on ‘no first use’, and ‘no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States’. India had continued to observe a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive tests.

India urged the international community to create a world order devoid of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. In that regard, India supported the need for negotiations on the establishment of an international convention to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Such a convention could form a solid ground for achieving the international community’s objective for nuclear disarmament. Parliamentarians had a crucial role to play in establishing multilateral regimes to achieve non-proliferation of weapons with a view to complete disarmament. Parliamentary cooperation could be used to develop internationally acceptable political, legal, educational, humanitarian and economic instruments to facilitate arms control and disarmament. In such endeavours the ethics of law, politics and economics must remain guiding principles. Resources from arms limitation agreements should be devoted to economic and social development to reduce the ever-widening gap between developing and developed countries, and to move towards the attainment of the MDGs. Parliamentarians must actively engage in securing non-proliferation and disarmament, by mobilizing public opinion and influencing the actions of governments.

Mr. Z. MADASA (South Africa) said that the activities of the South African Government were based on its foreign policy vision of a peaceful world. South Africa complied fully with all its obligations under the NPT, and urged all States that had not ratified the Treaty to do so. Like Ukraine, South Africa had fully eliminated its nuclear programme voluntarily and in a transparent manner. South Africa was the coordinator of the New Agenda Coalition, which had played an important role in the 2000 NPT Review Conference. South Africa continued to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but emphasised the need for total transparency at the domestic and international levels in that regard. He wished to point out that in Africa small arms and light weapons were used as weapons of mass destruction, and he therefore urged the parliaments of the European Union and Eastern European countries to monitor the supplies of those weapons in order to prevent their proliferation. Nuclear States should sign legally binding certificates of assurance to guarantee that they would not use their weapons against non-nuclear weapons States. Such agreements were crucial to deterring non-nuclear weapon States from acquiring nuclear weapons for defence. He urged parliaments to be involved in policy formulation in respect of nuclear issues.

Mr. V. POPOV (Belarus) said that Belarus had always supported international efforts for disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and enhancing collective security at all levels. Belarus had repeatedly initiated proposals in the international arena for the prohibition of the development and manufacturing of new types of weapons of mass destruction. Belarus had been the first country to refuse nuclear weapons voluntarily, and had renounced its arsenal in 1996. The Belorussian Parliament had signed and ratified all the major treaties on nuclear non-proliferation. Furthermore, the Parliament had considered that non-proliferation and disarmament could only be achieved by maintaining the unity of the three pillars of the NPT: nuclear non-proliferation; the inalienable right of all parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; and the pursuance of negotiations in good faith on the cessation of the nuclear arms race. The parliamentary community should promote that idea internationally and nationally. The universalization of the NPT was particularly important. All parliamentarians should actively influence their governments. The provision of legally-binding security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States could provide an added incentive for accession to the NPT. The Parliament of Belarus regretted the lack of ratification of the CTBT, which had prevented its entry into force. He called on all States that had not yet ratified it to do so as soon as possible, as well as to comply with Resolution N° 1540 of the United Nations Security Council and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Mr. T. SAMBUAGA (Indonesia) said that Indonesia actively supported international efforts for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Since nuclear weapons threats were not only exercised by States but also by terrorists who had access to nuclear weapons, efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation were the responsibility of the global community. Non-proliferation and disarmament needed to be discussed through multilateral frameworks, such as the NPT, the Safeguard Agreements of the IAEA, and other conventions on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Indonesia could not accept discriminatory approaches to non-proliferation. Although the NPT had prevented horizontal proliferation, it had not fully succeeded in preventing the practical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indonesia had set nuclear
disarmament as a national priority. The Indonesian Parliament called for all States parties to the NPT to commit to non-proliferation. Nuclear tests using simulation and non-explosion techniques were contrary to the spirit of the CTBT, which prohibited all types of nuclear testing. Indonesia had no intention of developing nuclear weapons or conducting nuclear testing. His parliament fully supported international efforts to achieve the entry into force of the CTBT. The ratification process of international agreements should be properly adjusted to the constitutional processes of each nation. The Indonesian Parliament had been making efforts to expedite the ratification of the CTBT.

Mr. N. CHERGINETS (Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus and the Russian Federation) said that the draft resolution should mention the need to establish an international system of expert control, to ensure prevention of the transport of nuclear materials across State borders. His delegation was particularly concerned by the intention of the United States to produce low-power nuclear explosive devices, and to install conventional warheads on ballistic missiles. When such missiles were launched it was impossible to establish whether they contained conventional or nuclear warheads. It was therefore easy to presume that a nuclear strike, which would have catastrophic consequences for the planet, could be a logical response to an attack with such a weapon. The necessary international architecture could not be created by one State alone, no matter how powerful. Security was indivisible. International stakeholders should therefore stop competing, and join forces for a successful outcome for nuclear disarmament.

Mr. W. AL-TABTABAE (Kuwait) said that over the past sixty years the Middle East had suffered greatly from wars, and the peoples of the region had paid a terrible price for that insecurity. The Middle East was an area where regional and international disputes were settled. The international community must do its utmost to support efforts for the comprehensive disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Under the aegis of the United Nations, efforts should be made to enable the international community to achieve its goals and ensure effective international surveillance, such as through the IAEA. Kuwait had participated in all negotiations concerning the CTBT and had been one of the first signatories of that Treaty. The Middle East should be a nuclear weapons-free zone. Israel should accede to the CTBT and open its nuclear installations to the IAEA for inspection and monitoring. His delegation would support all initiatives to that end. He urged all States in the region to continue their cooperation with the IAEA. Account must be taken of the fact that all States had the right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology under the aegis of the IAEA.

Mr. P. MUSHELENGA (Namibia) said that Namibia was party to the NPT and had had comprehensive safeguards in place since 1998. It had signed the additional protocol in 2000. In that nuclear weapons could cause untold destruction, Namibia had supported efforts for non-proliferation and disarmament, and for the full implementation of the NPT. The only use of uranium in Namibia was for the generation of electricity, since the country had faced power shortages. The country was a major producer of uranium, and was therefore interested in the advancement of nuclear non-proliferation and the entry into force of the CTBT, in order to ensure that uranium production was for peaceful purposes only. Namibia had signed and ratified the CTBT, and in implementing its obligations under the Treaty, the Government had approved a plan to establish an international monitoring station in Tsumeb. He hoped that by the 2010 NPT Review Conference further progress would have been made in the number of ratifications of the NPT and CTBT.

Ms. A. MUBARAK (Bahrain) said that nuclear proliferation was a subject of concern to many countries, in particular for developing countries that did not have such technology available. Parliaments should adopt legislation to eliminate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and should encourage governments to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Women and children in developing countries were the most vulnerable to the misuse of nuclear technology, since those countries were often used as dumping grounds for nuclear waste. The proposals and resolutions of the Committee of Women Parliamentarians must be taken into account. The potential environmental risks of nuclear technology should be given careful consideration. Legislation should be drafted to put an end to the sale of nuclear matter on the black market. Efforts should be made toward putting pressure on Israel to end its development of nuclear weapons.
Mr. T. TÓTH, Executive Secretary, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission, Panellist, said that it was clear from the statements made during the debate that the past decade had been considered a low point in the history of non-proliferation. Consideration should be given to how much time remained to resolve that issue. New environmental questions were being raised. The international community required solutions to address the increase in fissile materials, which were estimated to increase by at least three-fold by 2030. The CTBT had been exposed to many challenges. It was encouraging to have heard so many expressions of support for the Treaty’s entry into force. Ratifications had doubled since 1998. He hoped that positive action from the United States, China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt and the Islamic Republic of Iran would enable the Treaty to enter into force. There was a system in place to support the Treaty; it simply required a step forward to enter into force and become a reality.

Mr. R. PRICE (Australia), co-Rapporteur, said that the comments and suggestions would be taken into account to improve the report. This discussion reflected the new will and determination of all parliamentarians to support nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Mr. A. WARE, Global Coordinator, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Panellist, said that as pointed out by the Delegate of South Africa, the link between small arms and light weapons and weapons of mass destruction was particularly pertinent. That considerable link made collaboration between parliamentary networks crucial. Parliamentarians in the Republic of Korea had played a critical role in opening a dialogue with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and ensuring accountability. He agreed that parliamentary dialogue alone was insufficient. When the DPRK had withdrawn from the NPT, it had done so on the grounds that it felt at threat from nuclear weapons and the preventive use of force therefore had been used by some States against others. That preventive use of force should be replaced. Treaties, while essential, were not sufficient to address disarmament, and should therefore be considered from a context of a comprehensive approach: a nuclear weapons convention.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.