Letter dated 29 June 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In its report entitled Weapons of Terror, the independent international Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Dr. Hans Blix, puts forward a number of proposals on how the world could be freed of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

The Commission’s 14 members unanimously endorsed the report, which was presented to you on 1 June. It is currently being presented to Governments, nongovernmental organizations and the general public around the world.

The Commission was convened by the Swedish Government, which also provided the main funding for the secretariat and the work of the Commission. I kindly ask you to arrange to have the present letter and the annexed summary of the report distributed as a document of the General Assembly at its sixtieth session under agenda items 97 and 120.

Please be advised that the complete text of the Commission’s report is available online, at http://wmdcommission.org.

(Signed) Anders Lidén
Permanent Representative of Sweden
Annex to the letter dated 29 June 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Weapons of Terror

Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms

Chairman’s preface

In September 2003, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, was brutally killed. Inspirational, young and full of initiative, she would have had much more to contribute to making the world a better place.

During the first months of 2003, Anna phoned me from time to time to inform herself about the United Nations inspection work in Iraq, for which I was responsible. She and many of her colleagues were very unhappy about the drift towards military action against Iraq and felt that the inspectors should be given more time for their search for weapons of mass destruction. She also felt, however, that a sceptical attitude to armed action was not enough. It had to be matched by more active policies on the issue of non-proliferation. I fully agreed with her and was pleased to see that in June 2003 she and her colleagues in the European Union declared new joint policies.

These policies, in my view, started from sensible premises: that the best solution to the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was that countries should no longer feel that they needed them and that violators should be encouraged to walk back and rejoin the international community. These policies stressed the need for a cooperative approach to collective security and a rule-based international order. They highlighted the role of international verification and effective multilateralism. They also supported, as a last resort, however, the position that coercive measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter could be taken, with the Security Council as the final arbiter.

By the end of June 2003, when the occupation of Iraq was a fact and I was leaving the United Nations, Anna Lindh contacted me again. She thought that the time was right not only for the new European policies but also for an idea first advanced by Jayantha Dhanapala, then United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament: the creation of an independent international commission to examine how the world could tackle the problem of weapons of mass destruction. She asked if I would chair such a commission. I said I would.

After Anna Lindh’s death, the Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson, and Anna’s successor as Foreign Minister, Laila Freivalds, gave me a free hand to establish the Commission. I have been fortunate to secure the participation of high-calibre members, who have contributed their ideas, knowledge, judgement — and texts. The Commissioners consisted of Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Alexei G. Arbatov, Marcos de Azambuja, Alyson J. K. Bailes, Jayantha Dhanapala, Gareth Evans, Patricia Lewis, Masashi Nishihara, William J. Perry, Vasantha Raghavan, Cheikh Sylla, Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Pan Zhenqiang and Hans Blix, Chairman. They have all taken part in practical political, diplomatic or military work related to the maintenance of peace and the reduction of armaments. The Commission has not
aimed at utopian goals but has ardently and jointly sought to exercise judgement and point to constructive avenues out of difficulties that are still with us. While this preface is mine, the report and its recommendations reflect the joint effort of the Commission.

The Swedish Government has generously financed most of the costs of the Commission and — as separately acknowledged — several other Governments and other sources have kindly contributed, especially the Simons Foundation in Vancouver, Canada.

Three previous independent international commissions have presented valuable reports in the same field.

In 1982, a commission headed by Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden submitted a report entitled Common Security. It argued that the nuclear arms race and mutual assured destruction (MAD) could destroy human civilization and that security could only be attained through cooperation and disarmament. It pinned its hopes on the strong antiwar opinion, which feared nuclear annihilation. Although the cold war continued, significant bilateral arms-control agreements were concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was a harbinger of a new climate.

In 1996, there appeared the Australian Government-sponsored Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. After the end of the cold war, this was a period of bright hope. After the successful United Nations-authorized Gulf War in 1991, which stopped Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait, United States President George H. W. Bush talked about “a new world order”. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was achieved in 1995 after commitments to nuclear disarmament had been reaffirmed by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The Canberra Commission urged that practical steps to eliminate nuclear weapons should be taken immediately.

In August 1998, just months after Pakistan’s and India’s nuclear tests, the Government of Japan organized the independent Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Its final report, issued a year later, presented an “Action Plan” dealing with nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorism.

Soon thereafter, however, the United States Senate declined to support ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. With little or no progress on nuclear disarmament, with nuclear proliferation an ongoing reality and with growing fears of the dangers of terrorism, the post-cold war window of opportunity was closing, despite other more positive trends.

In the ten years that have passed since the Canberra Commission report was published, global economic interdependence has accelerated. All States of the world have come to face the same environmental threats and risks of contagious diseases. There have been no serious territorial or ideological conflicts between the major military Powers. Yet, amazingly, the climate for agreements on arms control and disarmament has actually deteriorated.

Efforts to consolidate global treaties, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, have stagnated, ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remain lagging, and negotiations have
not even opened on the much needed treaty to stop the production of fissile material for weapons.

There are even some waves of new armaments: the United States missile shield may be triggering countermeasures by China and Russia in the nuclear weapons area; and nuclear weapons with new missions may be under development in the United States and elsewhere. While the peaceful uses of space and satellites are developing at a dizzying pace, which facilitates global information exchange and communication, the most advanced military Powers are calculating how they can most effectively pursue war in this environment.

In spite of all this, Governments and world public opinion are paying less attention to the global regimes for arms control and disarmament. One reason is the intense and justified focus on the war on terrorism and the handling of specific cases of actual or potential nuclear proliferation. Another reason may be that global treaties did not help to prevent the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 and constituted insufficient barriers against the efforts of Iraq, North Korea and Libya to acquire nuclear weapons and against Iran to conceal a programme for the enrichment of uranium.

While the reaction of most States to the treaty violations was to strengthen and develop existing treaties and institutions, the United States, the sole super-Power, has looked more to its own military power for remedies. The United States National Security Strategy of 2002 made it clear that the United States would feel free to use armed force without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council to counter not only an actual or imminent attack involving WMD but also a WMD threat that might be uncertain as to time and place. The declared United States policy — reaffirmed on this point by the strategy issued in March 2006 — has, as I see it, parted ways with the United Nations Charter provisions on self-defence. The aim of the strategy is said to be “to help make the world not just safer but better”, indicating that the United States believed that this policy had benefits for all.

No one underestimates the difficulties on the road to disarmament and to outlawing nuclear weapons in the same manner as the way in which other weapons of terror — biological and chemical weapons — have been outlawed.

Some of the current stagnation in global arms control and disarmament forums is the result of a paralysing requirement of consensus combined with an outdated system of bloc politics. However, a more important reason is that the nuclear-weapon States no longer seem to take their commitment to nuclear disarmament seriously — even though this was an essential part of the NPT bargain, both at the Treaty’s birth in 1968 and when it was extended indefinitely in 1995.

The devaluation of international commitments inherent in these positions risks undermining the credibility and effectiveness of multilateral treaty commitments.

Against a generally gloomy short-term outlook for arms control and disarmament, some positive features can be discerned in the broader field of security. The number of inter-State armed conflicts has been declining. Peacekeeping operations have prevented and continue to prevent shooting wars in many places. Efforts to reform the United Nations have borne some fruit and more may be hoped for. The new United Nations Peacebuilding Commission will assist States emerging from conflicts, thereby reducing the risk of their relapse into violence.
The Security Council recently adopted an important resolution obligating Member States to adopt domestic legislation designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The precedent is constructive. But if the Council were to further use and develop its quasi-legislative potential, it would need to ensure that it acts with the broad support of United Nations Members. In the longer run, this would entail making the Council more representative of the United Nations membership.

Lastly, in today’s rapidly integrating world community, global treaties and global institutions, like the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), remain indispensable. Even with their shortcomings they can do some important things that States acting alone cannot achieve. They are, therefore, essential instruments in the hands of the international community to enhance security, jointly operate inspection systems and reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Governments that have shown disenchantment with global treaties and institutions will inevitably return and renew their engagement.

When there is a greater general readiness to return to a cooperative multilateral system in the sphere of arms control and disarmament, the Commission’s report will, I hope, contribute to the practical agenda. Some ideas and recommendations are new, but the Commission also espouses and argues in favour of some well-known existing proposals.

Indeed, at the present time it seems to me that not only successes in the vital work to prevent proliferation and terrorism but also progress in two additional areas could transform the current gloom into hope. Bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force would significantly impede the development of new nuclear weapons. The weapons that exist today are bad enough. Negotiating a global treaty to stop the production of fissile material for weapons would close the source for new such material and help hinder possible arms races — notably in Asia.

In both of these areas the United States has the decisive leverage. If it takes the lead, the world is likely to follow. If it does not take the lead, there could be more nuclear tests and new nuclear arms races.

(Signed) Hans Blix
Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission
May 2006
Weapons of Terror

Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms

Synopsis

Why action is necessary

Nuclear, biological and chemical arms are the most inhumane of all weapons. Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they can, in the hands of either States or non-State actors, cause destruction on a vastly greater scale than any conventional weapons, and their impact is far more indiscriminate and long-lasting.

So long as any State has such weapons — especially nuclear arms — others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain in any State’s arsenal, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. Any such use would be catastrophic.

Notwithstanding the end of the cold war balance of terror, stocks of such weapons remain extraordinarily and alarmingly high: some 27,000 in the case of nuclear weapons, of which around 12,000 are still actively deployed.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) cannot be uninvented. But, they can be outlawed, as biological and chemical weapons already have been, and their use made unthinkable. Compliance, verification and enforcement rules can, with the requisite will, be effectively applied. And with that will, even the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is not beyond the world’s reach.

Over the past decade, there has been a serious, and dangerous, loss of momentum and direction in disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. Treaty-making and implementation have stalled and, as a new wave of proliferation has threatened, unilateral enforcement action has been increasingly advocated.

In 2005 there were two loud wake-up calls in the failure of the NPT Review Conference and in the inability of the World Summit to agree on a single line about any WMD issue. It is critical for those calls to be heeded now.

What must be done

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission makes many specific and detailed recommendations throughout its report (see Annex 1 of the report for a consolidated list). The most important of them are summarized below.

1. Agree on general principles of action

   • Disarmament and non-proliferation are best pursued through a cooperative rule-based international order, applied and enforced through effective multilateral institutions, with the United Nations Security Council as the ultimate global authority.

   • There is an urgent need to revive meaningful negotiations, through all available intergovernmental mechanisms, on the three main objectives of
reducing the danger of present arsenals, preventing proliferation and outlawing all weapons of mass destruction once and for all.

- States, individually and collectively, should consistently pursue policies designed to ensure that no State feels a need to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
- Governments and relevant intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental actors should begin preparations for a world summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction to generate new momentum for concerted international action.

2. Reduce the danger of present arsenals: no use by States — no access by terrorists

- Secure all weapons of mass destruction and all WMD-related material and equipment from theft or other acquisition by terrorists.
- Take nuclear weapons off high-alert status to reduce the risk of launching by error; make deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons; place all non-strategic nuclear weapons in centralized storage; and withdraw all such weapons from foreign soil.
- Prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and phase out the production of highly enriched uranium.
- Diminish the role of nuclear weapons by making no-first-use pledges, by giving assurances not to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and by not developing nuclear weapons for new tasks.

3. Prevent proliferation: no new weapon systems — no new possessors

- Prohibit any nuclear-weapon tests by bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force.
- Revive the fundamental commitments of all NPT parties: the five nuclear-weapon States to negotiate towards nuclear disarmament and the non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain from developing nuclear weapons.
- Recognize that countries that are not party to the NPT also have a duty to participate in the disarmament process.
- Continue negotiations with Iran and North Korea to achieve their effective and verified rejection of the nuclear-weapon option, while assuring their security and acknowledging the right of all NPT parties to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- Explore international arrangements for an assurance of supply of enriched uranium fuel and for the disposal of spent fuel, so as to reduce incentives for national facilities and diminish proliferation risks.

4. Work towards outlawing all weapons of mass destruction once and for all

- Accept the principle that nuclear weapons should be outlawed, as are biological and chemical weapons, and explore the political, legal, technical and procedural options for achieving this within a reasonable time.
• Complete the implementation of existing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and work actively to establish zones free of WMDs in other regions, particularly and most urgently in the Middle East.

• Achieve universal compliance with, and effective implementation of, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and speed up the destruction of chemical weapon stocks.

• Achieve universal compliance with, and effective implementation of, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and improve cooperation between industry, scientists and Governments to reinforce the ban on the development and production of biological weapons and keep abreast of developments in biotechnology.

• Prevent an arms race in space by prohibiting any stationing or use of weapons in outer space.
Annex 1: Recommendations of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission

Nuclear weapons

Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

1. All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty need to revert to the fundamental and balanced non-proliferation and disarmament commitments that were made under the Treaty and confirmed in 1995 when the Treaty was extended indefinitely.

2. All parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should implement the decision on principles and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament, the decision on strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process and the resolution on the Middle East as a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, all adopted in 1995. They should also promote the implementation of the “thirteen practical steps” for nuclear disarmament that were adopted in 2000.

3. To enhance the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, all Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear-weapon States parties should accept comprehensive safeguards as strengthened by the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional Protocol.

4. The States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should establish a standing secretariat to handle administrative matters for the parties to the Treaty. This secretariat should organize the Treaty’s Review Conferences and their Preparatory Committee sessions. It should also organize other treaty-related meetings upon the request of a majority of the States parties.

5. Negotiations with North Korea should aim at achieving a verifiable agreement including, as a principal element, North Korea’s manifesting its adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and accepting the 1997 Additional Protocol, as well as revival and legal confirmation of the commitments made in the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: notably, that neither North nor South Korea shall have nuclear weapons or nuclear-reprocessing and uranium-enrichment facilities. Fuel-cycle services should be assured through international arrangements. The agreement should also cover biological and chemical weapons, as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, thus making the Korean peninsula a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

6. Negotiations must be continued to induce Iran to suspend any sensitive fuel-cycle-related activities and ratify the 1997 Additional Protocol and resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to avoid an increase in tensions and improve the outlook for the common aim of establishing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The international community and Iran should build mutual confidence through measures that should include: reliable assurances regarding the supply of fuel-cycle services; suspending or renouncing sensitive fuel-cycle activities for a prolonged period of time by all States in the Middle East; assurances against attacks and subversion aiming at regime change; and facilitation of international trade and investment.

7. The nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should provide legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States
parties. The States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty that possess nuclear weapons should separately provide such assurances.

8. States should make active use of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as a forum for exploring various ways to reduce proliferation risks connected with the nuclear fuel cycle, such as proposals for an international fuel bank; internationally safeguarded regional centres offering fuel-cycle services, including spent-fuel repositories; and the creation of a fuel-cycle system built on the concept that a few “fuel-cycle States” will lease nuclear fuel to States that forgo enrichment and reprocessing activities.

9. States should develop means of using low-enriched uranium in ships and research reactors that now require highly enriched uranium. The production of highly enriched uranium should be phased out. States that separate plutonium by reprocessing spent nuclear fuel should explore possibilities for reducing that activity.

10. All States should support the international initiatives taken to advance the global clean-out of fissile material. Such support should encompass the conversion of research reactors from highly enriched to low-enriched uranium fuel, storing fissile material at centralized and secure locations and returning exported nuclear materials to suppliers for secure disposal or elimination.

11. All Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so should ratify the protocols of the treaties creating regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. All States in such zones should conclude their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA and agree to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol.

12. All States should support continued efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as a part of the overall peace process. Steps can be taken even now. As a confidence-building measure, all States in the region, including Iran and Israel, should commit themselves for a prolonged period of time to a verified arrangement not to have any enrichment, reprocessing or other sensitive fuel-cycle activities on their territories. Such a commitment should be coupled with reliable assurances about fuel-cycle services required for peaceful nuclear activities. Egypt, Iran and Israel should join the other States in the Middle East in ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

13. India and Pakistan should both ratify the CTBT and join those other States with nuclear weapons that have declared a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons, pending the conclusion of a treaty. They should continue to seek bilateral détente and build confidence through political, economic and military measures, reducing the risk of armed conflict, and increasing transparency in the nuclear and missile activities of both countries. Eventually, both States should become members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as parties to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements under the terms of the 1997 Additional Protocol.

Preventing nuclear terrorism

14. States must prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons or fissile material. To achieve this, they must maintain fully effective accounting and control of all stocks of fissile and radioactive material and other radiological sources on
their territories. They should ensure that there is personal legal responsibility for any acts of nuclear terrorism or activities in support of such terrorism. They must expand their cooperation through inter alia the sharing of information, including intelligence on illicit nuclear commerce. They should also promote universal adherence to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Reducing the threat and the numbers of existing nuclear weapons

15. All States possessing nuclear weapons should declare a categorical policy of no-first-use of such weapons. They should specify that this covers both pre-emptive and preventive action, as well as retaliation for attacks involving chemical, biological or conventional weapons.

16. All States possessing nuclear weapons should review their military plans and define what is needed to maintain credible non-nuclear security policies. States deploying their nuclear forces in triads, consisting of submarine-launched missiles, ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers, should abandon this practice in order to reduce nuclear-weapon redundancy and avoid fuelling nuclear arms races.

17. Russia and the United States should agree on reciprocal steps to take their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert and should create a joint commission to facilitate this goal. They should undertake to eliminate the launch-on-warning option from their nuclear war plans, while implementing a controlled parallel decrease in operational readiness of a large part of their strategic forces, by:

- reducing the number of strategic submarines at sea and lowering their technical readiness to launch while in port;
- storing nuclear bombs and air-launched cruise missiles separately from relevant air fields;
- storing separately nose cones and/or warheads of most inter-continental ballistic missiles or taking other technical measures to reduce their readiness.

18. Russia and the United States should commence negotiations on a new strategic arms reduction treaty aimed at reducing their deployments of strategic forces allowed under the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions by at least half. It should include a legally binding commitment to irreversibly dismantle the weapons withdrawn under the Moscow Treaty. The new treaty should also include transparent counting rules, schedules and procedures for dismantling the weapons and reciprocal measures for verification.

19. Russia and the United States, followed by other States possessing nuclear weapons, should publish their aggregate holdings of nuclear weapons on active and reserve status as a baseline for future disarmament efforts. They should also agree to include specific provisions in future disarmament agreements relating to transparency, irreversibility, verification and the physical destruction of nuclear warheads.

20. All States possessing nuclear weapons must address the issue of their continued possession of such weapons. All nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must take steps towards nuclear disarmament, as required
by the Treaty and the commitments made in connection with the Treaty’s indefinite extension. Russia and the United States should take the lead. Other States possessing nuclear weapons should join the process, individually or in coordinated action. While Israel, India and Pakistan are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they, too, have a duty to contribute to the nuclear disarmament process.

21. Russia and the United States should proceed to implement the commitments they made in 1991 to eliminate specific types of non-strategic nuclear weapons, such as demolition munitions, artillery shells and warheads for short-range ballistic missiles. They should agree to withdraw all non-strategic nuclear weapons to central storage on national territory, pending their eventual elimination. The two countries should reinforce their 1991 unilateral reduction commitments by developing arrangements to ensure verification, transparency and irreversibility.

22. Every State that possesses nuclear weapons should make a commitment not to deploy any nuclear weapon, of any type, on foreign soil.

23. Any State contemplating replacement or modernization of its nuclear-weapon systems must consider such action in the light of all relevant treaty obligations and its duty to contribute to the nuclear disarmament process. As a minimum, it must refrain from developing nuclear weapons with new military capabilities or for new missions. It must not adopt systems or doctrines that blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons or lower the nuclear threshold.

24. All States possessing nuclear weapons, notably Russia and the United States, should place their excess fissile material from military programmes under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. To facilitate the reduction of stocks of highly enriched uranium, States possessing such stocks should sell uranium blended to enrichment levels suitable for reactor fuel to other Non-Proliferation Treaty States or use it for their own peaceful nuclear energy needs.

25. All States possessing nuclear weapons should adopt strict standards for the handling of weapons usable fissile material deemed to be in excess to military requirements or recovered from disarmament activities, as exemplified in the United States stored-weapon and spent-fuel standards.

26. The Conference on Disarmament should immediately open the delayed negotiations for a treaty on the cut-off of production of fissile material for weapons without preconditions. Before, or at least during, those negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament should establish a group of scientific experts to examine technical aspects of the treaty.

27. To facilitate fissile material cut-off negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, the five Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear-weapon States, joined by the other States possessing nuclear weapons, should agree among themselves to cease production of fissile material for weapon purposes. They should open up their facilities for such production to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards inspections, building on the practice of Euratom inspections in France and the United Kingdom. These eight States should also address the issue of verifiable limitations of existing stocks of weapons usable nuclear materials.

28. All States that have not already done so should sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty unconditionally and without delay. The United States, which has not ratified the Treaty, should reconsider its position and
proceed to ratify the Treaty, recognizing that its ratification would trigger other required ratifications and be a step towards the Treaty’s entry into force. Pending entry into force, all States with nuclear weapons should continue to refrain from nuclear testing. Also, the 2007 conference of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty signatories should address the possibility of a provisional entry into force of the Treaty.

29. All signatories should provide financial, political and technical support for the continued development and operation of the verification regime, including the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre and its secretariat, so that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is ready to monitor and verify compliance with the Treaty when it enters into force. They should pledge to maintain their respective stations and continue to transmit data on a national basis under all circumstances.

From regulating nuclear weapons to outlawing them

30. All States possessing nuclear weapons should begin planning for security without nuclear weapons. They should start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint practical and incremental measures that include definitions, benchmarks and transparency requirements for nuclear disarmament.

Biological and toxin weapons

31. All States not yet party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should adhere to the Convention. The States parties to the Convention should launch a campaign to achieve universal adherence by the time of the Seventh Review Conference to be held in 2011.

32. To achieve universal adoption of national legislation and regulations aimed at full and effective implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the States parties should offer technical assistance and promote best-practice models of such legislation. As a part of the confidence-building process and in order to promote transparency and harmonization, all States parties should make annual biological-weapon-related national declarations and make them public.

33. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should enhance the investigatory powers of the United Nations Secretary-General, ensuring that the Secretary-General can rely upon a regularly updated roster of experts and advice from the World Health Organization and a specialist unit, modelled on the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, to assist in investigating unusual outbreaks of disease and allegations of the use of biological weapons.

34. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should establish a standing secretariat to handle organizational and administrative matters related to the Treaty, such as review conferences and expert meetings.

35. Governments should pursue public health surveillance to ensure effective monitoring of unusual outbreaks of disease and develop practical methods of coordinating international responses to any major event that might involve bioweapons. They should strengthen cooperation between civilian health and security-oriented authorities at the national, regional and global levels, including in the framework of the new International Health Regulations of the World Health
Organization. Governments should also review their national biosafety and biosecurity measures to protect health and the environment from the release of biological and toxin materials. They should harmonize national biosecurity standards.

36. At the Sixth Review Conference, in 2006, the States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should reaffirm common understandings reached at previous review conferences and take action on all subjects addressed at Convention meetings since 2003. They should also establish a work programme on additional topics for future meetings. States parties should ensure more frequent reassessment of the implications of scientific and technological developments and reaffirm that all undertakings under article I of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention apply to such developments. This Review Conference should reaffirm that all developments in the life sciences fall within the scope of the Convention and that all developments in the life sciences for hostile purposes are prohibited by the Convention.

Chemical weapons

37. States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention must provide adequate resources to ensure that there are no undue delays in the agreed destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles.

38. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should continue their efforts to secure universal adherence to the Convention. States parties should fully implement the rules on trade and transfer of chemicals that are precursors to chemical-weapon agents. They should further develop regulations regarding the trade and transfer of chemicals that can be used to produce chemical weapons. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and States parties should continue to offer States positive incentives, including technical assistance, to join and implement the Chemical Weapons Convention. When providing such assistance or transferring relevant technologies, they should consider steps to ensure safe and responsible handling by the recipient.

39. States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should confirm that, like the use of riot control agents, the use of toxic chemical agents for purposes of law enforcement is banned as a method of warfare. Accordingly, each State party must declare any such agent under article III.

40. States parties should ensure that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has the resources, experience and legal authority needed to carry out challenge inspections in a timely and effective manner, including the taking and removal of samples for testing.

41. Through their domestic laws and policies, all States should prohibit the production, possession and use of toxic chemicals and technologies for purposes that are banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention. States should ensure the security of chemical facilities and security within such facilities through legislation and agreement with industry. States should also develop national means to monitor that security standards are met.

42. States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention should use the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as a coordinating centre in
the development of global standards for a chemical industry security culture. The Organization should offer evaluation and security assistance at declared sites. States parties should also strengthen the capacity of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to provide practical assistance against chemical weapons, for instance detection equipment, alarm systems and medical antidotes.

**WMD delivery means, missile defences, and weapons in space**

43. Member States of the Missile Technology Control Regime should make new efforts to better implement and expand export controls on relevant materials and technology. States subscribing to the Hague Code of Conduct should extend its scope to include cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. They should establish a multilateral data exchange centre, based on the Russian-United States initiatives for the exchange of data on missile launches from early-warning systems. Regional and international non-proliferation measures should include information exchanges, launch notification and restrictions or bans on specific items or capabilities.

44. States should not consider the deployment or further deployment of any kind of missile defence system without first attempting to negotiate the removal of missile threats. If such negotiations fail, deployments of such systems should be accompanied by cooperative development programmes and confidence-building measures to lower the risk of adverse effects on international peace and security, including the risk of creating or aggravating arms races.

45. All States should renounce the deployment of weapons in outer space. They should promote universal adherence to the Outer Space Treaty and expand its scope through a protocol to prohibit all weapons in space. Pending the conclusion of such a protocol, they should refrain from activities inconsistent with its aims, including any tests against space objects or targets on earth from a space platform. States should adapt the international regimes and institutions for space issues so that both military and civilian aspects can be dealt with in the same context. States should also set up a group of experts to develop options for monitoring and verifying various components of a space security regime and a code of conduct, designed inter alia to prohibit the testing or deployment of space weapons.

46. A review conference of the Outer Space Treaty to mark its 40th year in force should be held in 2007. It should address the need to strengthen the Treaty and extend its scope. A special coordinator should be appointed to facilitate ratifications and liaise with non-parties about the reinforcement of the Treaty-based space security regime.

**Export controls, international assistance, and non-governmental actors**

47. All States should conduct audits of their export-control enforcement agencies (customs, police, coast guard, border control and military) to ensure that they can carry out their tasks effectively. States should seek to establish a universal system of export controls providing harmonized standards, enhanced transparency and practical support for implementation. Members of the five export control regimes should promote a widening of their membership and improve implementation in view of current security challenges, without impeding legitimate trade and economic development.
48. The Group of Eight (G-8) Global Partnership should expand the geographical and functional scope of its non-proliferation assistance. The G-8 should guarantee full funding for the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production programme. Potential donors should consider how technical assistance, training, equipment and financing could be brought to bear to help States of all regions implement United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

49. Companies engaged in activities relevant to weapons of mass destruction have the ability and responsibility to help prevent the proliferation of such weapons and an interest in demonstrating that they are fulfilling that responsibility, including full compliance with national and international obligations and public transparency. Trade associations should also promote such objectives.

50. States, international organizations and professional associations should encourage the appropriate academic and industrial associations to adopt and effectively implement codes of practice and codes of conduct for science and research in weapons of mass destruction-relevant fields.

51. Governments possessing any weapons of mass destruction should keep their parliaments fully and currently informed of their holdings of such weapons and their activities to reduce and eliminate them. Parliaments should actively seek such information and recognize their responsibility in formulating policies relevant to weapons of mass destruction issues. Greater inter-parliamentary cooperation on weapons of mass destruction issues is needed.

52. States should assist non-governmental organizations to participate actively in international meetings and conferences and to inform and campaign in the weapons of mass destruction field. Private foundations should substantially increase their support for organizations that are working to eliminate global weapons of mass destruction threats.

53. Organizations with security-relevant agendas should re-examine the 2002 United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education and should consider ways in which they could foster and support such education and an informed public debate. Governments should fund student internships at multilateral institutions working on weapons of mass destruction issues.

**Compliance, verification, enforcement and the role of the United Nations**

54. As the strengthened safeguards system adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency through the Additional Protocol should become standard for parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supplier States should make acceptance of this standard by recipient parties a condition for contracts involving nuclear items.

55. Governments should instruct their intelligence authorities to assist international inspection agencies by providing relevant information without compromising the independence of the inspection systems.

56. The United Nations Security Council should establish a small subsidiary unit that could provide professional technical information and advice on matters relating to weapons of mass destruction. At the request of the Council or the Secretary-General, it should organize ad hoc inspections and monitoring in the field, using a roster of well-trained inspectors that should be kept up-to-date.
57. International legal obligations regarding weapons of mass destruction must be enforced. International enforcement action should be taken only after credible investigation and authoritative finding of non-compliance with legal obligations.

58. In order for the Conference on Disarmament to function, it should be able to adopt its Programme of Work by a qualified majority of two thirds of the members present and voting. It should also take its other administrative and procedural decisions with the same requirements.

59. The United Nations General Assembly should convene a world summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, which should meet after thorough preparations. This world summit should also discuss and decide on reforms to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations disarmament machinery.

60. The United Nations Security Council should make greater use of its potential to reduce and eliminate threats of weapons of mass destruction — whether they are linked to existing arsenals, proliferation or terrorists. It should take up for consideration any withdrawal from or breach of an obligation not to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Making use of its authority under the Charter to take decisions with binding effect for all members, the Council might, inter alia:

• require individual States to accept effective and comprehensive monitoring, inspection and verification;
• require Member States to enact legislation to secure global implementation of specific rules or measures; and
• decide, as instance of last resort, on the use of economic or military enforcement measures.

Before United Nations reform has made the Security Council more representative of the United Nations membership, it is especially important that binding decisions should be preceded by effective consultation to ensure that they are supported by the membership of the United Nations and will be accepted and respected.