PLACE DU PETIT-SACONNEX
1211 GENEVA 19
| INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION PLACE DU PETIT-SACONNEX 1211 GENEVA 19 |
|
REPORT OF IPU DELEGATION
Organizational Framework for the Elections
Determination of the Election Results
Annex I: Results of the elections Annex II: Code of Conduct established by the UN Electoral Law for Cambodia (1992) Annex III: Statement to the media by the IPU delegation at the end of its stay in Cambodia
At its 152nd session, the Inter-Parliamentary Council decided to send a delegation to Cambodia to observe all relevant aspects of the organization and conduct of the elections which were held from 23 to 28 May 1993 and to report on its observations and findings as to whether they were carried out in conformity with the United Nations Electoral Law for Cambodia (1992). The delegation was composed of Mr. Andrew Peacock, Chairman (Australia), Mr. Warren Snowdon (Australia), Shri Chandrajeet Yadav (India), Mr. Chris Mullin (United Kingdom) and Mr. David Wilshire (United Kingdom). Mr. Anders B. Johnsson, Assistant Secretary General of the IPU, acted as Secretary to the delegation and travelled to Phnom Penh on two previous occasions - February and April 1993 - to prepare for the mission. The full delegation visited Cambodia from 19 to 28 May. During this period, members of the delegation observed voting in well over one hundred polling stations in fourteen of the country's twenty-one provinces. In addition, the delegation held several meetings with leaders of political parties, senior UNTAC officials, the core group of Ambassadors in Cambodia and human rights and other national and international organizations. During these meetings, the delegation also collected information on the campaign which preceeded the polling period. Moreover, the Assistant Secretary General, who had arrived in the country on 16 May to finalize arrangements for the mission, stayed behind until 4 June to observe the final phase of the electoral process involving the determination of the results of the vote. The present report is divided into five sections, the first of which provides a brief overview of the organizational framework for the elections. Part two of the report provides information obtained by the delegation regarding the political campaign which preceded the polling. The third section contains the delegation's observations and findings regarding the polling itself, whereas the fourth section addresses the determination of the election result. The fifth and final section of the report briefly re-states the overall findings of the delegation and makes some additional recommendations for future United Nations operations of a similar nature. Given the mission's terms of reference, each one of the three main sections of the report recalls specific articles of the UN Electoral Law for Cambodia and provides information related thereto, based either on the delegation's own direct observations or on information which it obtained during its stay in Cambodia. Since clearly every article could not be addressed (the law contains a total of 95 articles), only some of those which the delegation deemed to be of central importance to a free and fair election have been included.
In submitting this report to the 153rd session of the Inter-Parliamentary
Council, the members of the delegation wish to express their appreciation
to all those who facilitated their work during their stay in Cambodia
and foremost to the Cambodian people who, through their massive
turnout on the polling days, demonstrated their commitment to
participatory democracy.
10 June 1993
Chairman
Warren Snowdon, MP Shri Chandrajeet Yadav, MP
Secretary ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ELECTIONS 1. The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict was signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. Under this Agreement the Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC) is "the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined". The SNC has delegated all necessary powers to the United Nations to ensure the implementation of the Agreement. 2. Subsequently, the United Nations Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) which had been foreseen in the Agreement. Plans for the deployment of UNTAC were approved on 28 February 1992 with a mandate which encompassed aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons, and the rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructures during the transition period. 3. UNTAC became operational on 15 March 1992. Since then it has deployed around 1,500 civilians, 16,000 military staff, 3,600 police in addition to several thousands of Cambodians. The total cost for the eighteen month operation exceeds one-and-a-half billion dollars. 4. On the eve of the elections, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the main obstacle to the implementation of UNTAC's mandate since its establishment had been the refusal of one of the parties (PDK) to meet the obligations it had assumed in signing the Agreement. It had neither demobilized its armed forces, nor had it granted UNTAC personnel access to the zones under its control. On the contrary, in violation of the cease-fire it had sought to extend the territory it controls. PDK Radio had also launched increasingly vitriolic attacks on UNTAC and had directed violent propaganda against Vietnamese-speaking persons in Cambodia. Members of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), the armed forces of the PDK, had been implicated in massacres of Vietnamese-speaking persons, stated the Secretary-General, and had on many occasions also temporarily detained UNTAC personnel. Since the latter part of March 1993, members of UNTAC had been the subject of several attacks, many of them in circumstances that strongly indicated the involvement of the PDK. 5. In response to what it described as encroachment by the NADK, the Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF) which are the military forces of the SOC had launched attacks on the NADK, which in UNTAC's view also constituted violations of the cease-fire. The Secretary-General added that SOC had also been blamed for organizing or condoning violent attacks on the personnel and officers of political parties contesting the elections, particularly FUNCINPEC. These developments had forced UNTAC to modify its activities, especially the deployment and tasks of its Military Component. 6. Notwithstanding the above, preparations continued throughout the transition period for the holding of the elections. The United Nations Electoral Law for Cambodia was adopted on 12 August 1992. It provides for the 120 member Constituent Assembly to be elected by a proportional system with distribution of seats taking place on the basis of party lists at the provincial level. Every Cambodian person who is eighteen years or more during the registration process is entitled to vote. 7. That process was launched in October 1992 and concluded in March 1993 when over 96 percent of the total eligible population, or 4,764,430 Cambodians, had registered to vote. These included most of the 300,000 Cambodians who had been refugees in neighbouring countries and who had also been assisted to return to their country.
8. UNTAC's Electoral Component is charged with organizing and
conducting the elections. To this end, it recruited some 465 United
Nations Volunteers who were deployed as District Electoral Supervisors
responsible for recruiting, training and supervising the Cambodian
polling teams. As many as 50,000 Cambodians were recruited to
man these teams. In addition, UNTAC recruited over 800 International
Polling Station Officers (IPSOs) - 17 of them provided by the
IPU. They were complemented by UNTAC staff and, following a three-day
training course, were deployed to the polling sites to assist
the Presiding Officer in the performance of his duties. 9. The Electoral Law states that the objective of the election campaign shall be to enable the parties, their candidates, members and supporters to disseminate their intended policies to the voters for discussion and consideration. A total of twenty political parties registered to take part in the elections (see Annex I for complete list). The PDK is not among these parties. 10. UNTAC stipulated that the campaign period would last from 7 April to 19 May 1993. It would be followed by a "cooling-off" period, prior to the polling which would take place from 23 to 28 May. 11. In examining whether the campaign was carried out in accordance with the Electoral Law, the delegation sought to obtain information on certain key aspects which included the conduct of the campaign, fair access to the media and campaign behaviour. 12. Article 35 of the Electoral Law stipulates that "all political parties, and their candidates, members and supporters shall conduct themselves during the election campaign and during polling in accordance with the rules and principles set out in this Law and the Code of Conduct, and with respect for the principles of human rights and democracy proclaimed in the Agreement". The Code of Conduct (see Annex II) proscribed, inter alia, intimidation, harassment and violence. 13. From the information it obtained, the delegation discerned two separate developments. On the one hand, political rallies were held peacefully and without any significant disturbances. UNTAC reported that at the end of the campaign period, some 1,500 rallies had been held throughout the country which had been attended by in excess of 800,000 Cambodians. No violence or disruption had seemingly occurred at these rallies. While a few parties alleged that their supporters had been prevented from attending their rallies, UNTAC declared that those attempts had largely failed. 14. On the other hand, UNTAC reported a considerable number of serious instances of political violence, harassment and intimidation. In his report to the Security Council in February 1993, the Secretary-General noted three types of categories into which threats to public order in Cambodia can be divided: politically motivated attacks on political party offices and staff, attacks on Vietnamese-speaking persons, and killings that seem to have no particular political motivation but which spread a climate of fear and intimidation. He noted that scores of incidents of political or ethnic violence had occurred since August 1992, which by the beginning of 1993 had resulted in some 60 deaths. While responsibility for the killings of Vietnamese-speaking persons had generally been attributed to NADK elements, UNTAC investigations indicated that the great majority of attacks on political party offices and members could be attributed to soldiers, police or supporters of SOC. 15. In a statement to the media on 23 May, the Director of UNTAC's Human Rights Component recalled that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and the administration of justice rests with the Cambodian parties. He noted that one party (PDK) had refused all co-operation with UNTAC and made no pretence to respect the rights of the population. Two other parties (FUNCINPEC and KPNLF) had no civil system or legal structures in place in their respective zones of control, which remained essentially lawless. For its part, the State of Cambodia (SOC) had made minimal efforts to apprehend those responsible for political attacks. 16. During the period from 1 March to the middle of May 1993, UNTAC had thus recorded 27 separate attacks against members of political parties, 25 attacks and instances of intimidation of civilians carried out by the NADK, seven incidents of racial violence, 19 other incidents of political harassment and intimidation and 32 attacks on UNTAC personnel. As a result, 200 persons had died, 338 had been injured and 114 had been abducted. UNTAC announced that so far its investigations had identified NADK responsibility for 131 deaths, 50 injuries and 53 abductions, whereas SOC/CPAF responsibility could be imputed for at least 15 deaths and 9 injuries. 17. The Director of the Human Rights Component clarified that in addition, a number of arbitrary executions and attempted killings had taken place. While not necessarily politically motivated, these incidents had been perpetrated by armed factions and units against civilians and had resulted in 65 deaths and 44 injuries, further undermining the neutral political environment. He added that since these statistics were established a further seven members of the FUNCINPEC party had been killed and 16 others injured. 18. Article 36 of the Electoral Law stipulates that "to ensure fair access of the media, including press, television and radio for all political parties contesting the election, all newspapers and broadcasting media controlled by public authorities of Cambodia shall be made available at no cost to the Special Representative for the purpose of publicity and electoral education connected with the election". 19. In order to ensure fair access to the media, UNTAC issued a special directive on 4 April and organized TV panels in which representatives of the contesting parties could present their political platforms. UNTAC reported that there had been some instances where the national television had refused to broadcast UNTAC-produced and approved fair access programmes. Such incidents had for the most part been resolved. In addition, UNTAC's own radio transmitting 15 hours daily throughout the country was made available on an equal basis to all parties contesting the elections for the purpose of disseminating their political platforms. 20. In his report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that UNTAC had strongly pressed the Phnom Penh authorities to desist from its attempts to block the import and use of television broadcasting equipment by FUNCINPEC. He noted that on 22 April, following UNTAC's intervention, FUNCINPEC was able to recover this equipment and could subsequently make use of it for campaign purposes. UNTAC also noted reported incidents where political parties faced difficulties in importing campaign material into the country, but that most incidents had been resolved, albeit belatedly. 21. UNTAC had also adopted measures to enable political parties to exercise full freedom of movement. In one instance, UNTAC reported that an aircraft acquired by FUNCINPEC for campaign purposes had been blocked by the Phnom Penh authorities. When they persisted in their refusal despite an SNC decision to allow the use of the aircraft, UNTAC put one of its own aircraft at FUNCINPEC's disposal and announced that it would do the same for any other party that could demonstrate that its freedom of movement was being unreasonably restricted by the authorities (two other parties requested and received such assistance). Eventually, FUNCINPEC was permitted the partial use of its aircraft. 22. Article 39 of the Electoral Law stipulates that "all registered political parties and candidates, in exercising their right of access to the media, shall refrain from promoting violence, deception or confusion, and from seeking to undermine the secrecy of the ballot, and from using offensive language". The Code of Conduct further states that parties and candidates shall at all times avoid using language which threatens or incites to violence in any form against others. 23. In order to further compliance with this provision, UNTAC vetted TV spots and radio commercials produced by the political parties to ensure that they did not contain offensive language. On the other hand, it noted that several of the parties used inflammatory language during campaign rallies and incited violence against Vietnamese-speaking people. In two instances, voters were de-registered for having violated this provision.
24. UNTAC also received reports that the Cambodian People's Party
(CPP) used the existing resources and staff of the state apparatus
for electoral purposes. In his report to the Security Council,
the Secretary-General expressed concern at the surveillance conducted
by the authorities of the Cambodian parties at all levels aimed
at identifying political opponents and the harassment and intimidation
of perceived opponents. He noted that all three existing administrative
structures to which UNTAC had access had mobilized their resources
to promote political support and informed the Security Council
that a series of directives addressing this problem had been issued
by UNTAC and signed by the three Cambodian parties complying with
the Agreement. 25. Prior to the polling period, the PDK vowed to disrupt the conduct of the polls. In response to the numerous security incidents leading up to the elections and the firm opposition expressed by that party, UNTAC decided not to conduct polling in areas controlled by the armed forces of the PDK (NADK), nor in some remote areas in which they operated (these latter areas were thinly populated and all located in the provinces of Siem Reap and Kompong Thom). As a result, the number of polling stations was reduced to about 1,400 while security measures were stepped up. 26. As originally planned, polling took place at fixed and mobile polling stations from 23 to 25 May. Some of the fixed stations were subsequently redeployed on 26 May as mobile stations where polling took place on 27 and 28 May. 27. During the polling period, the members of the delegation split up in separate teams and observed polling in 119 polling stations (8.5 percent of the total number) in fourteen of Cambodia's twenty-one provinces (Banteay Meanchey, Preah Vihear, Siem Reap, Battambang, Pursat, Kompong Chhnang, Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham, Phnom Penh, Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, Kampot, Takeo and Kandal). At all polling stations, the delegation witnessed large and enthusiastic crowds waiting to cast their ballot. At the end of the polling period, close to 90 percent of the registered voters had participated in the poll. 28. During their work, members of the delegation focussed on the secrecy of the vote, harassment, coercion or intimidation of voters, bussing of electors and the security of the ballot boxes. At the end of the polling period the members of the delegation issued a statement to the media in which they unanimously declared that "the poll has been as free and fair as could reasonably be expected and, as such, is a clear expression of the will of the Cambodian people" (full text of the statement can be found in Annex III). 29. Article 63 of the Electoral Law provides that voting at the election shall take place by secret ballot. To this end, the voting compartment shall be arranged so as to permit a voter to mark his or her vote in secrecy and no other person shall enter the voting compartment while a voter is in it for the purpose of recording the vote (Article 57). In addition, no person shall interfere or attempt to interfere with a voter when marking his or her vote, or otherwise attempt to obtain information as to the party for which any voter at that polling station is about to vote or has voted (Article 83). 30. The delegation did not observe any instance where the secrecy of the vote was compromised. While voting was brisk, particularly on the first day of polling, with the result that voters were pressing forward to record their vote, members of the delegation could verify in a number of instances that polling officers intervened to ensure that no more than one person was in or near the voting compartment at any one moment. 31. The delegation spoke with party agents in several polling stations but received no complaints regarding the conduct of the poll. It was informed by UNTAC, however, that some allegations of a general nature had been made that polling station workers had influenced individual electors in their vote. It was not aware of any particular incident, except one in which a Cambodian polling station officer was alleged to have told electors how to vote. The delegation was informed that in that particular instance, the presiding officer had investigated and satisfied himself that the polling station officer was correctly performing his duty in accordance with Article 65 of the Electoral Law which provides that any voter who is not able to read shall be instructed by the presiding officer or a polling official in the manner of voting. Harassment, coercion and intimidation of voters 32. Article 86 of the Electoral Law stipulates that a person shall not, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of inducing or compelling any voter to vote or refrain from voting at the election, make use or threaten to make use of any violence, force or restraint, or inflict any bodily or psychological injury, damage, hazard or loss upon or against any person or his family, or do or threaten to do anything to the disadvantage of any person or his family. Similarly, the Article prohibits such means or any fraudulent device or contrivance to induce, compel or prevail upon any voter to vote or refrain from voting at the election or to vote in favour of a particular registered party or otherwise impede, hinder or prevent the free exercise of the franchise by any voter at the election. 33. In no instance did the members of the delegation observe harassment, coercion or intimidation of voters at the polling stations where they were present. In one polling station a member of the delegation was informed by an IPSO that one party agent had sought to ascertain from electors how they had voted. This had, however, quickly been discovered and the person in question reprimanded and prevented from entering into further contact with the voters. The delegation was aware that allegations had been made to the effect that one of the parties (CPP) had tried to influence voters, but did not receive any confirmation that this had in effect occurred. As regards the presence of armed CPAF soldiers or SOC Military at the polling station, the members of the delegation noted that in most instances they did not enter the prescribed 200 meters radius around the polling, and nowhere did they see armed soldiers enter the polling station itself. 34. Given the fact that the PDK had announced its determination to prevent the polling from taking place, the delegation paid particular attention to any instances that they, or any other party, tried to prevent the polling or individual voters from reaching polling stations. While isolated security incidents did occur throughout the polling period which had the effect of temporarily closing some polling stations, voting proceeded uninterrupted in the vast majority of polling stations. Individual members were also in a position to observe that civilians living in areas controlled by the PDK/NADK, or in areas where the latter operated and therefore no polling stations were opened, walked apparently unmolested to cast their vote in nearby polling stations. In some instances, large groups of such persons walked several hours in order to be able to cast their vote. Members of the delegation also observed what appeared to be members of the NADK casting their vote. 35. Given the accusation that at least one party (CPP) was resorting to the administrative structures of the State in order to gain an unfair advantage at the polls, the delegation sought to ascertain whether extensive bussing took place using State of Cambodia vehicles. The members of the delegation did not observe any systematic bussing, but noted in some instances that what appeared to be State of Cambodia owned vehicles were used to transport voters to some of the polling stations where they were present. The delegation also observed bussing by other parties, including by the PDK. 36. During its briefings in Phnom Penh prior to the polling, the delegation was informed of amendments which had been introduced into the Electoral Law (Article 8 (12) and (13)) whereby party seals could no longer be affixed to the ballot boxes. The reasons for this change, which was introduced on 25 March 1993, were stated by UNTAC to be the fact that the slot through which ballots would be inserted into the box was much too small and their concern that the boxes would be entirely covered by a seal from a party (and thus possibly have the effect of intimidating voters). In a separate meeting with the leaders of the CPP, the mission was informed of that party's concern over the ballot seals and the delegation was urged to transmit these concerns to UNTAC. Having done so, representatives of UNTAC and CPP met later that day (21 May) and UNTAC agreed to allow party agents to inspect the safety areas to which the ballot boxes would be transported for safekeeping overnight, due to security concerns, prior to the storing of the ballot boxes. 37. Subsequently, the CPP complained that its agents had not been granted access to safe areas other than in Phnom Penh and Battambang. UNTAC for its part shared with the delegation a copy of the order which was promulgated by the UNTAC Force Commander on the following day reflecting the agreement reached on 21 May. It also informed the delegation that, as far as it had been able to determine, the order had been complied with in all provinces. 38. The delegation was informed that on the night of the first day of polling, it became apparent that a number of ballot box seals used to secure the apertures of the ballot boxes (and a few padlock seals used to secure the lids of the ballot boxes) had broken during transport to the safety areas, largely a result of Cambodia's very poor road conditions. The delegation was given copies of the instructions which were immediately sent out by UNTAC to all Provincial Electoral Officers (PEOs) setting out a procedure for dealing with such instances. 39. In essence, the procedure required that the ballot box be kept under constant guard, that the PEOs be immediately informed, that the ballot boxes be immediately resealed in the presence of witnesses, including if possible representatives of the political parties, and that a record be made of the serial numbers of the broken and the replacement seal. The instruction also provided guidance on how to load and transport the boxes to minimize the danger of further broken seals. The following morning a further instruction was sent out providing additional guidance on how best to fit the seals on the ballot boxes. Although, according to UNTAC, the number of incidents drastically decreased after these measures were taken, all told several hundred ballot boxes had their seals broken during transport. 40. Having inspected some of the seals and on one occasion accompanied the ballot boxes during transport to a safe area and witnessed how transport was carried out in others, the delegation was satisfied that the breaking had been accidental, that UNTAC had promptly taken corrective measures, and that there was no evidence to suggest that the ballot had been affected in any way or that any party had gained as a result (see also paragraph 57 below).
41. In its meetings with leaders of the main political parties,
members of the delegation were reassured that despite the problems
which had arisen, they would nevertheless accept the result (in
the case of the CPP provided the number of votes which were found
in the affected ballot boxes did not exceed the number which the
records indicated should be there). DETERMINATION OF THE ELECTION RESULT 42. The determination of the election result took place separately for each province at a counting center located in the provincial capital, except for the tendered votes which were transferred to the main counting center in Phnom Penh. Verification and counting started on 29 May and was concluded in early June. A total number of 4,134,631 votes had been cast by those registered to vote, of which 123,304 were declared to be invalid votes (or 2.98 percent of the total). The final result of the election, indicating the number of votes and seats in the Constituent Assembly which were obtained by each party, is shown in Annex I. 43. The IPU Assistant Secretary General remained in Cambodia until 4 June to observe the verification and counting of the votes. He visited and observed the work carried out in the counting centres in Phnom Penh (including for the tendered ballots) and in Pursat, Kompong Cham, Kompong Thom, Kompong Speu, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng. Particular attention was placed on the verification process, the counting of the votes, the tendered ballots, the determination of rejected votes and, in view of the breaking of ballot box seals, the verification of votes in these boxes. 44. Article 71 of the Electoral Law stipulates that the provincial Electoral Officer shall separately verify each Presiding Officer's ballot paper account by comparing it with the contents of the packets received from each polling station and shall for that purpose open all the ballot boxes from each polling station and cause the ballot papers contained in them to be counted. 45. In the counting centres which were visited it was possible to observe that this provision was followed. In some centres, the verification process was completed before the counting started, whereas in others verification and counting proceeded simultaneously ensuring nevertheless that verification first took place of each polling station separately as required by the law. The different practice appeared to depend upon the space available to run two separate operations concurrently and the number of staff available. 46. In most instances it was observed that the number of votes which were supposed to be in any particular ballot box tallied exactly with the number of ballots actually found. In some instances, minor discrepancies not exceeding a dozen votes were found. UNTAC explained that this may be due to the fact some polling teams operated more than one ballot box simultaneously, something which had been observed by the delegation during its observation of the polling. It could also be due to the fact that some voters walked away with their ballot paper whereas others left it erroneously in the polling compartment itself instead of inserting it in the ballot box (this was in fact observed during the polling exercise by some members of the delegation, although the polling staff were vigilant and generally discovered the error before the voters left the compartment). 47. A further cause of error was the fact that the paper work carried out in some polling stations was less than perfect and some Presiding Officers and Assistant Presiding Officers had not filled in the forms in the correct manner which necessitated a lengthy verification process involving identifying the voting material and thereby establishing the correct number of votes which should be found in a particular ballot box. Counting of the number of unused and discarded ballots may also have been imperfect. 48. Article 73 provides that after the verification of the ballots, the Provincial Electoral Officer shall sort the ballot papers on the basis of the registered political parties in respect of which the votes were recorded and count the votes in respect of each registered political party. Separate regulations of the counting of the votes stipulated, in addition, that in order to respect the secrecy of the vote, the content of at least three ballot boxes were to be mixed before the counting started. 49. Wherever the counting procedure was observed these stipulations were complied with. After having sorted the ballot papers according to the party for which the vote had been cast, the ballot papers were stacked in bundles of fifty ballots each and subsequently counted. In case any discrepancy arose between the total number of votes thus recorded and the number of votes previously counted in the ballot boxes concerned, a recount was made. In those instances where this was observed, the recount showed correct numbers of votes counted. 50. It should nevertheless be noted according to the information received, these procedures and methods were not uniformly applied throughout the country. There were, for example, often substantial delays caused by difficulties in retrieving the correct forms. In addition, some counting centers appeared to lack the required number of staff and there were several reports of exhaustion of staff and party agents. 51. Article 67 of the Electoral Law stipulates that a voter shall be required to record a tendered ballot if: he cannot produce a registration card; he wishes to vote in any province other than the one for which he is registered as voter; he wishes to vote outside Cambodia; his name appears on a list of voters whose registration has been canceled; or the Presiding Officer is satisfied that the registration card has not been officially issued or the voter is not the person whose name appears on the registration produced by the voter. Articles 74 - 76 of the Law contain further provisions for the verification, examination and counting of tendered ballots. 52. Members of the delegation observed the casting of tendered votes in all polling stations they visited and this appeared to take place as provided for in the Law. At the end of the verification exercise, UNTAC announced that a total of 387,019 tendered ballots had been cast of which 136,816 were rejected upon verification that the voter was not registered. The remaining tendered ballots represented 6.05 per cent of the total number of votes cast by registered voters. 53. The verification, examination and counting of all tendered ballots took place at the main counting center in Phnom Penh. The Assistant Secretary General had several opportunities to observe this process. The tendered ballots cast by voters who had produced a registration card were separated and divided up by province for subsequent counting. All other tendered ballots were first verified by UNTAC's voter registration computing center. Information regarding the name of the voter, his or her year of birth, sex and province of registration was fed into the main computer which made a search. In case a match was found (with minor modifications accepted for the spelling of names and exact year of birth), the ballot was returned to the counting center where the original registration record was provided to fingerprint and handwriting experts, together with the ballot envelope, for final verification. The first small sample of ballots showed that roughly 25 per cent of ballots encountered a match in the computer registry. 54. Article 73 of the Electoral Law provides that the Provincial Electoral Officer shall reject and not count any ballot paper which records votes to more than one registered political party; or in respect of which he has reasonable grounds to believe that it has not been officially issued to a voter; which is unmarked or on which it is impossible to determine with certainty for which political party the ballot was cast; or which contains a mark or statement by the voter which tends to identify the voter. 55. The total number of rejected ballots amounted to 2.98 percent of the total number of ballots cast by registered voters which under the circumstances may be considered as very low. This may in part be attributed to the very successful voter education campaign which had been run by UNTAC. In those instances where the rejection of ballots was witnessed, it was possible to observe that most tended to be rejected because no mark had been put on the ballot paper or the mark had been affixed next to the seal of UNTAC and not in a box corresponding to a registered political party. As provided for in the law (Article 73), it was observed that ballots were not rejected when they did not contain a tick as long as the voter had clearly indicated his or her choice with a mark of any nature or in writing. 56. In the counting centre in Prey Veng, a ballot box was observed in which the ballots had incorrectly been separated from the ballot book in such a manner that they still contained their serial number. Following a complaint from one registered party agent to the effect that this could nullify the secrecy of the vote, the Chief Electoral Officer decided to reject these ballots. Treatment of ballot boxes with broken seals 57. When it was discovered that many ballot boxes had suffered broken seals during transport, the Chief Electoral Officer directed all counting stations to ensure that during the counting of votes, ballot papers from such boxes should not be mixed with ballots from boxes on which the seals never broke. In the counting stations which were visited it was possible to observe that a separate counting took place for these boxes. From the information thus obtained it did not appear that any one party had gained a number of votes which were disproportionate to the number received in the province. 58. In one particular incident, UNTAC officials and party agents observed that ballots "flew" out of a ballot box during transport from the polling station to the safe area. Those ballots which were picked up were handed over at the safe area and reportedly re-introduced in the presence of witnesses into the ballot box which by then had been identified because it displayed both a broken seal and a broken padlock seal. The ballot box was subsequently resealed and not used. During a visit to the counting station, it was possible to inspect the ballot box and observe the investigation which took place to determine the exact circumstances surrounding the mishap. Pending conclusion of that investigation, the ballots contained in the box have not been counted.
59. A CPP party agent declared he had gathered two ballots from
this box and alleged that many more might have been lost during
the transport of the box. There was no evidence to suggest that
this was the case, however, and the delegation was satisfied that
the UNTAC investigation would establish if there was any defect
in procedure or counting which would cause this accident to affect
the integrity of the vote. 60. The operation in Cambodia is one of the most comprehensive and massive undertakings ever attempted by the United Nations in its almost fifty years of existence and represents the first time it has been responsible for the organization and conduct of a national general election. Given the recent history of Cambodia and the prevailing security and related conditions under which the election was conducted, the delegation expressed its admiration for all those who made it possible though their professional performance, whether international staff, Cambodian election officials or party agents. 61. The delegation reaffirmed the importance of election observer missions witnessing the whole electoral process, including the campaign period. While it noted the difficulty for MPs to be absent from Parliament for an extended period of time, it believed that this objective could be met, for example, through separate visits to the country by smaller teams. Since, however, the decision to send an observer delegation to Cambodia had been taken at a very late stage, this had not been possible to arrange. The delegation expressed the hope that this could be done in future exercises of this nature. 62. Not having had the possibility to observe the campaign first hand, the delegation nevertheless obtained information on its conduct and placed on record its concern over the numerous incidents of politically motivated violence, harassment and intimidation of voters. Moreover, the delegation recommended that the United Nations be provided with more substantial resources to promote and ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms should it undertake similar operations elsewhere in the future. 63. As regards the polling itself, the delegation concluded that despite many incidents involving primarily the breaking of seals and padlock seals, the voting had been as fair and free as could reasonably be expected and, as such, was a clear expression of the will of the Cambodian people. The delegation was gratified to note the enthusiasm expressed by the Cambodian electorate which massively participated in the elections, and expressed the hope that the result of the election would be respected by all the political parties. 64. The delegation had limited opportunities to observe the determination of the results, but was nevertheless satisfied that despite minor deficiencies in the paper work which can be corrected through normal verification procedures, this part of the process had also been carried out as stipulated in the Electoral Law.
65. Finally, and based upon its conviction that elections are
but part of a larger process which aims at ensuring participatory
democracy, the delegation recommended that the Inter-Parliamentary
Union and the international community extend all necessary support
to the Constituent Assembly and its successor National Assembly
of Cambodia.
RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS
CODE OF CONDUCT 1. All persons, all political parties, their leaders, members and supporters, all provisionally and officially registered political parties, their leaders, members, supporters and candidates, shall abide by this Code of Conduct. 2. All political parties are entitled to and shall enjoy, the fundamental right of a free and fair election, including the freedom to campaign. 3. All political parties shall respect the right and freedom of all other parties to campaign, and disseminate their political ideas and principles without fear. 4. In particular, all political parties, officially and provisionally registered political parties, their leaders, members, supporters and candidates shall obey the following rules: (1) Intimidation, in whatever form, shall be prohibited, and manuals, instructions and orders of political parties and provisionally and officially registered political parties shall reinforce and emphasise this prohibition. (2) The possession and use of any weapon of any kind, or of any instrument capable of use as a weapon, at any political rally, meeting, march or demonstration shall be prohibited. Parties' manuals, instructions and orders shall reinforce this prohibition. (3) Parties and candidates shall inform the local UNTAC office of any planned public meetings or political rallies, and shall in good faith take all necessary steps to avoid violent confrontation or conflict between their supporters, and shall comply with all directions, instructions or orders issued by UNTAC in relation to such meetings. (4) All parties shall avoid the coincidence, in time or place, of their meetings, rallies, marches or demonstrations with those of other parties, and to this end they shall liaise and cooperate with UNTAC and with other parties. (5) All parties, their members and supporters, shall refrain from disrupting the meetings, marches or demonstrations of other parties. (6) Parties and candidates shall at all times avoid, in speeches, broadcasts, pamphlets, newsletters, press statements, posters, their party platforms, campaign advertisements or otherwise, using inflammatory language or other language which threatens or incites violence in any form against others. (7) All political parties shall refrain from obstructing persons from attending the meetings, marches or rallies of other parties. (8) All parties shall refrain from plagiarising the symbols of other parties, and shall steal, destroy or disfigure the political or campaign material or posters of other parties, or the election information material of UNTAC. (9) All political parties, and especially their leaders, shall ensure freedom of access of other parties to all potential voters on public or private property, in camps or reception centres, or wherever they may be. Parties shall ensure that potential voters wishing to participate in political activities are free to do so. (10) All parties shall consistently reinforce and emphasise to their supporters and to all voters that the ballot will be secret, and that no person will know how any individual has voted. (11) All parties shall establish effective communication with one another at the central, provincial and district levels, and shall appoint liaison personnel, to be available for this purpose at all times, to deal with any problem arising during registration of voters, the campaign or the polling. (12) All parties shall attend at least once every two weeks a meeting under the chairmanship of the Chief Electoral Officer to discuss any matters of concern relating to the campaign. In addition, a standing committee of leaders of registered political parties shall attend at least every two weeks a meeting under the chairmanship of the Special Representative or his deputy to deal with matters of concern relating to the campaign. The above-mentioned meetings shall commence from a date to be determined by the Special Representative. (13) All parties shall bring all information or complaints regarding intimidation or other allegations of unlawful conduct immediately to the attention of UNTAC. (14) Parties shall not abuse the right to complain, nor make false, frivolous or vexatious complaints. (15) All parties shall cooperate fully with the Special Representative's Electoral Advisory Committee. (16) All parties shall issue instructions and orders to their members and supporters to observe the Electoral Law, this Code, the instructions of UNTAC officials, and all orders and directives of the Special Representative, and take all necessary steps in good faith to ensure compliance with the Electoral Law and this Code. (17) The Special Representative and all parties shall publicise this Code and the electoral law throughout Cambodia by all means at their disposal.
STATEMENT BY THE IPU DELEGATION AT THE END OF ITS VISIT TO
CAMBODIA Phnom Penh, 28 May 1993 The IPU ( Inter-Parliamentary Union) delegation in Cambodia to observe the election process today said in advance of its final report that they believed the polling had taken place in accordance with the United Nations Electoral Law for Cambodia and that as such it was both free and fair. The delegation was composed of Mr. Andrew Peacock, Chairman (Australia), Mr. Warren Snowdon (Australia), Shri Chandrajeet Yadav (India), Mr. Chris Mullin (United Kingdom) and Mr. David Wilshire (United Kingdom) and observed polling in well over one hundred polling stations in 14 of the 20 provinces (including some in areas controlled by the different factions) as well as in Phnom Penh. The delegation said that while there had been some difficulties with the administration of the poll, such as the accidental breaking of ballot box seals during transport, it was satisfied that the UN had promptly taken corrective measures and there was no evidence to suggest that the ballot had been affected in any way or that any party had gained as a result. In observing the polling process, the delegation did not see any evidence to suggest that people were coerced to vote in a particular way. On the contrary, the overwhelming enthusiasm and the high voter turnout suggest that voters were keen to participate and exercise a democratic choice. "It is clear to us that the poll has been as fair and free as could reasonably be expected and, as such, is a clear expression of the will of the Cambodian people", said the members. While not at this stage commenting on the campaign period, the delegation also had several meetings with leaders of political parties, UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) officials, the diplomatic community and human rights organizations to inform itself of this part of the process. In addition, the delegation left behind a representative of the IPU Secretariat who will follow the tallying of the votes. A full report covering the whole electoral process will subsequently be submitted to the IPU's governing body for its information. The IPU is the worldwide organization of parliaments which works to promote contacts among parliamentarians and for the firm establishment of representative institutions.
|