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JAPAN
Shugiin (House of Representatives)
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT

Compare data for parliamentary chambers in the Oversight module

Chapters:

Parliament name (generic / translated) Kokkai / National Diet
Structure of parliament Bicameral
Chamber name Shugiin
Related chamber (for bicameral parliaments) Sangiin / House of Councillors
POLITICAL SYSTEM
Type of political regime parliamentary
Notes The Emperor is the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power (Article 1 of the Constitution). The Diet is the highest body of state power and the sole law-making body (Article 41 of the Constitution). It consists of two Houses, the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors (Article 42 of the Constitution).
Head of the executive Prime Minister
Notes Executive power is vested in the cabinet (Article 65 of the Constitution), which consists of the Prime Minister, who is its Head, and other ministers of state (Article 66 of the Constitution).
Method for appointing the executive The Imperial Throne is dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the Imperial House Law passed by the Diet (Article 2 of the Constitution). The Prime Minister is designated from among the members of the Diet by a resolution and appointed by the Emperor (Article 6 and Article 67 of the Constitution). This designation precedes all other business. The Prime Minister appoints the ministers of state, a majority of whom must be chosen from among the members of the Diet (Article 68 of the Constitution). The Prime Minister may remove ministers as he/she chooses.
Term of office of the executive and coincidence with the term of the legislature The term of office of members of the House of Representatives is four years (Article 45 of the Constitution). There are no provisions to stipulate the term of office for the Prime Minister, but it normally coincides with the term of the legislature.
Incompatibility of the functions of member of the executive and member of Parliament No A majority of ministers of state must be chosen from among the members of the Diet (Article 68, paragraph 1, of the Constitution).
Dissolution of Parliament Yes
  • Circumstances
The term of office of members of the House of Representatives may be terminated before the full term is up in case the House is dissolved (Article 45 of the Constitution). There is no limit on the reason for dissolution. In practice, the dissolution is pronounced when the people's judgement is sought on a politically important issue or an issue concerning important policies that arouse controversy between the cabinet and the Diet, or when there is a valid reason to consider that the House does not represent public opinion.
  • Modalities
When the House of Representatives is dissolved, there must be a general election of members of the House within 40 days from the date of dissolution, and the Diet must be convoked within 30 days from the date of the election. The House of Councillors is closed at the same time. The lower House was dissolved in 1996, 2000 and 2003 between 1995 and 2005.
ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability of Government to Parliament Yes The cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, is collectively responsible to the Diet (Article 66, paragraph 3 of the Constitution). The advice and approval of the cabinet is required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the cabinet is also responsible for such acts (Article 3 of the Constitution).
Modalities of oversight
  • Oral and written questions of parliamentarians
There are two categories of question, one is to clarify doubtful points, and the other is to ask the cabinet for an explanation of the facts concerning national politics in general, or ascertain the government's view. Questions can be formulated orally or in writing. A question of an urgent nature can be put orally by a resolution of the House. They can give rise to debate when government refutes a question from a committee member, when free discussion is conducted between members in committees, and when the Prime Minister and the opposition leaders have a dialogue in a committee.
  • Government reports to Parliament
The government's accountability to the parliament is brought into play by the submission of final accounts and the report on the state of national finances.
Measures
  • Vote of confidence on Government programs and/or legislative proposals
If the House of Representatives rejects a confidence resolution, the cabinet must resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within 10 days (Article 69 of the Constitution).
Motions of censure and votes of no confidence (sub-report)
  • Circumstances
A motion of censure can be tabled in the case of disapproval of actions taken by the government, in case of a breach of the Constitution or laws, and when the government does not take an appropriate measure.
  • Modalites
For a parliamentarian to present a no-confidence resolution, it is necessary to secure the support of at least 50 members in the House of Representatives. Whether the House passes a resolution or rejects it is decided by a majority of those present.
  • Consequences
If the House of Representatives passes a no-confidence resolution the cabinet must resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within 10 days. Between 1995 and 2005, nine no-confidence motions against the cabinet were tabled, all from the opposition, and one was adopted in 1993.
Dismissal and/or impeachment of Government and other public officials (sub-report)
  • Circumstances and persons concerned
The House of Representatives has no procedure for dismissal of members of the executive. However, the Diet sets up an impeachment court from among the members of both Houses for the purpose of trying those judges against whom removal proceedings have been instituted (Article 64 of the Constitution).
  • Modalites and procedure
Not applicable
  • Consequences
Not applicable
  • Have these procedures been applied?
Not applicable
OVERSIGHT OVER THE ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
Oversight over the actions of the Government administration Yes The Prime Minister exercises control and supervision over various administrative branches (Article 72 of the Constitution). The cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, is collectively responsible to the Diet (Article 66, paragraph 3, of the Constitution).

Also, when a bill is adopted at the committee stage, in some cases, a supplementary resolution calling for a diet report on the measure concerning the bill is adopted, but this resolution has no legal binding force.
Means and modalities of oversight
  • Hearings in Committees
The Prime Minister and other ministers may, at any time, appear in either House for the purpose of speaking on bills, regardless of whether they are members of the House or not. They must appear when their presence is required in order to give answers or explanations (Article 63 of the Constitution). Also, when the chairman of a committee deems the committee's consideration or investigation necessary on precise or technical matters relating to the administration, the chairman requests the presence of a government informant to hear his or her explanation on such matters.
  • Committees of inquiry and missions to Government departments
Each House may conduct investigations in relation to the government, and may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and the production of records (Article 62 of the Constitution). A committee may hold open hearings on important measures and matters of popular concern and for general purposes, and may hear views from the interested parties or people of learning and experience. Also, a House may send out its members for the purpose of considering measures and so forth, or investigating state administration, or whenever the House deems it necessary.
  • Oral and written questions of parliamentarians
There are two categories of question, one is to clarify doubtful points, and the other is to ask the cabinet for an explanation of the facts concerning national politics in general, or to ascertain the government's view. Questions can be put orally. When a minister makes a policy speech, or bills are deliberated, parliamentarians can ask about the subject under deliberation and related matters. When a parliamentarian puts a question in a plenary sitting, questions may not be made on the same subject more than three times.

When a parliamentarian desires to put a written question to the cabinet, he/she is required to obtain the approval of the Speaker of the House. The question must be presented to the Speaker as a concise statement in written form. If a parliamentarian raises an objection regarding a question of his or of hers, to which the Speaker has not given approval, the latter must put the case to a vote of the House without debate. The Speaker transmits to the cabinet statements of questions that he/she or the House have approved. The cabinet must answer a question within seven days from the day of receipt. If an answer cannot be made within the period, the cabinet is required to state clearly the reason, and the time by which an answer can be given.

A question of an urgent nature can be put orally by a resolution of the House. When a member of the House desires to put a question of an urgent nature, he or she presents it to the Speaker in written form in advance. The latter consults the committee on rules and administration about the handling of the question. Making an interpellation of an urgent nature requires the resolution of the House, in addition to the approval of the committee. Questions can give rise to debate when the government refutes a question from a committee member, when free discussion is conducted between members in committees, and when the Prime Minister and the opposition leaders have a dialogue in a committee.
  • Role of Parliament in the appointment of senior Government officials
The Diet is not involved in appointing senior government officials who are directly engaged in government agencies. The appointment of members and other posts in neutral government agencies, however, such as the chairman and members of the Fair Trade Commission, members of the National Public Safety Commission, the inspectors of the board Board of Audit and commissioners of the National Personnel Authority, requires the agreement and approval of the Diet.
  • Activity reports of the Government administration and of public services or establishments
In some cases, a law mandates the presentation of an annual report about specific government measures. Among special public corporations, government financial corporations need a resolution on their budget by the Diet and the presentation of an audit to the Diet.
  • Representation of Parliament in governing bodies of the Government administration
Not applicable
Existence of an ombudsman No
  • Method for appointing the executive
There is no Ombudsman in the central government, but the Committee on Oversight of Administration, which has jurisdiction to handle complaints against actions by the national administration, was set up as a standing committee that functions as an Ombudsman in the House of Representatives in 1998. Moreover, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications considers that the administrative counselling system operated by its evaluation bureau, functions as an Ombudsman. It also takes part in conferences organised by the international ombudsman institute as a regular member.
  • Relationship to Parliament
Not applicable
BUDGETARY OVERSIGHT
Consultation of Parliament in the preparation of the national budget No The cabinet prepares and submits to the Diet for its consideration and decision a budget for each fiscal year (Article 86 of the Constitution).
Modalities of oversight
  • Examination of the budget / finance act by Parliament
The budget bill can be initiated only by the cabinet and is first put before the House of Representatives. For a motion of amendment to the budget to be placed on the order of the day in a plenary sitting, it must be supported by at least 50 members of the House of Representatives or at least 20 members of the House of Councillors. Upon consideration of the budget, when the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, and when no agreement can be reached even through a conference committee of both Houses, or in the case of failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within 30 days after the receipt of the budget passed by the House of Representatives, the decision of the House of Representatives is the decision of the Diet (Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Constitution).
  • Reports on the budget / finance act by Committees
When the budget is referred to the Committee on Budget, that body may request the presence of the Prime Minister and other ministers of state and question them on the national administration in general. But the Committee on Budget makes no reports in this regard.
Fields overseen
  • Defence budget
The parliament exercises oversight over all public funds.
  • Budget of special departments
Not applicable
  • Role of Parliament in national development plans
Not applicable
Parliament's deadline for the examination and adoption of the budget / finance act There is no limit for the budget deliberation in the House of Representatives, but the House of Councillors is required to hold deliberations on it within 30 days after it is passed by the House of Representatives.
Consequences of failure by Parliament to adopt the budget / finance act If the House of Councillors fails to make a decision on the budget within 30 days after it receives it, the decision of the House of Representatives becomes the decision of the Diet. When the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, and when no agreement can be reached even through a conference committee of both Houses, the decision of the House of Representatives becomes the decision of the Diet (Article 60, paragraph 2, of the Constitution).
Budgetary autonomy of Parliament No Procedures for drawing up the parliamentary budget differ from that of administrative organs. The budget of the parliament is included in the general accounts budget.
OVERSIGHT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BUDGET AND OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
Evaluation of Government spending
Parliament approves Government expenditures annually Yes Final accounts of the expenditures and revenues of the State must be audited annually by a Board of Audit and submitted by the cabinet to the Diet, together with the statement of audit, during the fiscal year immediately following the period covered (Article 90 of the Constitution). Both Houses separately conduct deliberations and make resolutions on the accounts.
Parliamentary oversight of public companies Yes The Diet votes on the budget and the settlement of accounts of government-related organisations, such as the Development Bank of Japan. Based on its right to conduct investigations in relation to the government, the Diet can put questions to special corporations founded by special legislation and public-service corporations founded under the civil code.
Modalities of oversight
  • Body for auditing the Government's books and method for appointing
Final accounts of the expenditures and revenues of the State are audited annually by a Board of Audit (Article 90 of the Constitution). The Board is a part of the administration, but is assigned a position independent of the cabinet. It has three commissioners that are appointed by the cabinet, but their appointment requires the approval of the Diet.
  • Reports of the public auditor's office
The cabinet is obliged to submit the audit report of the Board of Audit to the ordinary Diet session in the next year. However, the report is not brought up as a resolution. The Diet is also authorised to ask the Board to audit specified government spending, and to report on the results.
  • Specialised committee
At regular intervals, and at least annually, the cabinet reports to the Diet and the people on the state of national finances (Article 91 of the Constitution).
OVERSIGHT OVER FOREIGN POLICY
Foreign Relations Committee (sub-report)
  • Functions of the Committee
The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence is a standing committee that oversees foreign policy.
  • Powers of the Committee
Every parliamentary measure is referred to the appropriate committee. After consideration by the committee, the measure is then put for consideration in a plenary sitting. The standing committee examines measures and treaties on foreign policy as a preliminary stage before the plenary sitting that is the final decision-making body.
  • Composition of the Committee
The composition of the committee reflects the numerical strength of each party in the parliament.
  • Bilateral visits of Parliament, inter-parliamentary conferences and information missions abroad
The parliament exercises oversight over foreign policy through bilateral visits, participation in inter-parliamentary conferences and information missions abroad.
  • Plenary debates on foreign policy issues
The Prime Minister, representing the cabinet, submits bills and reports on foreign relations to the Diet (Article 72 of the Constitution), and is questioned in the plenary sitting at the opening of each session. The Foreign Minister also delivers speeches on foreign policy and is questioned during the interpellations at the opening of each ordinary session.
Involvement of Parliament
  • Participation of Parliament in inter-governmental meetings
The initiative to dispatch delegations to intergovernmental meetings is taken by the Government, not the parliament. However, members of parliament with interest in such meetings as well as the Ministers or Secretaries General concerned, who often have status as members of parliament, are included in government delegations as the occasion arises.
  • Modalities and procedures for ratifying international treaties and agreements (sub-report)
The cabinet concludes international treaties, but must obtain prior or subsequent approval of the Diet (Article 73 of the Constitution). There is no official procedure whereby each House demands the cabinet call for approval of the Diet on certain treaties. Treaties for which approval of the Diet is needed are those that (i) include commitments related to the legislative power of the Diet; (ii) include financial obligations over the limit already approved by the budget or laws; and (iii) are important politically in the sense that they legally define basic relations to other countries or among countries in general, and therefore need to be ratified to take effect. According to this standard, the government decides which treaties need the approval of the Diet. A treaty presented to either House is referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs or a special committee. Regarding the approval of treaties, when there is disagreement between the two Houses, the decision of the House of Representatives prevails.
  • Other mechanisms for participation in foreign policy by Parliament
The cabinet manages foreign affairs, and therefore diplomacy falls under the cabinet's jurisdiction as part of its administrative powers. Both Houses of the Diet are involved in the formation and implementation of foreign policy indirectly, through deliberation on bills relating to foreign policy and the budget, the approval of treaties, questions to the government and the adoption of resolutions.
OVERSIGHT OVER NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY
National Defence Committee (sub-report)
  • Functions of the Committee
The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence is a standing committee that oversees defence policy.
  • Powers of the Committee
Every parliamentary measure is referred to the appropriate committee. After consideration by the committee, the measure is then put for consideration in a plenary sitting. The committee thus considers bills concerning defence policy prior to a plenary sitting.
  • Composition of the Committee
The composition of the committee reflects the numerical strength of each party in the parliament.
Parliamentary oversight of public arms manufacturing companies Not applicable
Circumstances and involvement
  • Modalities and procedures in case of war, an armed attack or a state of emergency
Article 9 of the Constitution stipulates that the Japanese people forever renounce war, will not maintain any war potential, and do not recognise the right of belligerency of the State. However, the Japanese Government's interpretation of this article is that it does not deny the right of self-defence that is inherent in any independent State, and that the exercise of the minimum capability necessary for self-defence is recognised on the basis of Article 9.

When ordering the deployment of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) in the case of the outbreak of an armed attack from outside, the imminent outbreak of such an attack or the forecast outbreak of such an attack, the Prime Minister must formulate a basic Response Plan stipulating overall policy and relating to acknowledgement of and response to the armed attack situation, and immediately obtain the approval of the Diet. If the Diet votes against this approval, or if the Diet votes for the end of the Response Measures, the Prime Minister must end the Response Measures promptly.

Also, in the case of the outbreak of an armed attack or the imminent outbreak of such an attack, the Prime Minister in principle can obtain the approval of the Diet beforehand, and can order the deployment of the SDF.

Furthermore, the abolition of the basic Response Plan and establishment of a Task Force consisting of all cabinet members must be reported to the Diet.
  • Role of Parliament in sending troops abroad
The Constitution does not permit the dispatch of armed forces into the territorial land, sea, or air space of another country with the purpose of using military force. However, the Government's interpretation is that the Constitution does not prohibit the dispatch of forces to another country without the purpose of using military force.

Overseas activities by the SDF include peacekeeping operations under the United Nations, activities for the response to international terrorism related to the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, and cooperation in efforts for the international community to reconstruct post-conflict Iraq.

Regarding United Nations peacekeeping operations, the Prime Minister is obligated to report to the Diet on the implementation plan, stipulating the content of activities. Also, if the SDF units are to monitor a ceasefire agreement or decommissioning of arms and to patrol a demilitarised zone, the Prime Minister in principle must obtain the approval of the Diet beforehand.

Regarding activities for the response to international terrorism and cooperation in efforts for the national reconstruction of Iraq, the Prime Minister is obligated to report to the Diet on the basic plan stipulating the content of activities. Also, if Response Measures are to be implemented by the SDF, the Prime Minister must obtain the approval of the Diet in principle within 20 days after the order. If the Diet votes against approval, the Prime Minister must end the Response Measures promptly.
  • Other mechanisms for participation in national defence policy by Parliament
The cabinet manages defence affairs. Both Houses of the Diet are involved in the formation and implementation of defence policy indirectly, through deliberation and voting on laws concerning defence policy.
STATE OF EMERGENCY
Circumstances At present there is no basic law relating to a state of national emergency in Japan. Of the states of emergency stipulated in individual laws, those situations in which the involvement of the Diet is obligatory are the following:

(i) Armed attack from outside;
(ii) Large-scale terrorism;
(iii) Riots;
(iv) Large-scale disaster.

In the case of (i), refer to 7(c) above.

In the case of (ii), the Prime Minister must formulate a response policy stipulating an overall policy and relating to acknowledgement of and response to the situation, submit it to the Diet within 20 days, and obtain the approval of the Diet. If the Diet votes against approval, the Prime Minister must end the countermeasures promptly. Also, the repeal of the response policy and establishment of a countermeasures headquarters consisting of all cabinet members must be reported to the Diet.

In the cases of (iii) and (iv), the Prime Minister must proclaim a state of emergency either throughout the country or in some areas, and take necessary action on the basis of this. The Prime Minister must submit the matter to the Diet in principle within 20 days after the proclamation of the state of emergency and ask for the Diet's approval. If the Diet votes against approval or for the repeal of the proclamation, the Prime Minister must repeal the proclamation promptly.

In the cases of (ii) and (iii), if public order cannot be maintained by the ordinary civil police force, the Prime Minister can order the deployment of the SDF. In this case, the Prime Minister must ask for the approval of the Diet in principle within 20 days after the order for deployment. If the Diet votes against approval, the Prime Minister must order the withdrawal of the SDF promptly.
Can parliament take the initiative to declare a state of emergency No
Consequences of a state of emergency for Parliament The declaration of a state of emergency does not affect the functioning of the Diet. When the House of Representatives is dissolved and the House of Councillors is closed at the same time, and if a state of emergency arises and urgent legislative actions are required, the cabinet can convoke the House of Councillors in emergency sessions (Article 54, paragraph 2, of the Constitution). Measures taken at such sessions are provisional and become null and void unless agreed to by the House of Representatives within a period of 10 days after the opening of the next session of the Diet (Article 54, paragraph 3, of the Constitution).
VERIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND THE APPLICATION OF LAWS
Modalities of oversight
  • Body ruling on the constitutionality of laws
Supreme Court / Tribunal The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act (Article 81 of the Constitution). The Court consists of a Chief Judge and other judges, the former being appointed by the Emperor as designated by the cabinet, and the latter being appointed by the cabinet (Article 6, paragraph 2, and Article 79 of the Constitution). The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court are reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following their appointment, and are reviewed again at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of 10 years, and in the same manner thereafter. When the majority of the voters favour the dismissal of a judge, he/she is dismissed.
  • Means and procedures
The constitutionality of a law is examined only in individual cases, when an ordinary court holds a trial and a decision is required for the solution of the case. The examination of whether a piece of legislation is constitutional or not thus requires the existence of an actual case. A court decision on the solution of an actual case affects only the parties concerned. Accordingly, the revision or abolition of a statute judged unconstitutional is entrusted to the Diet. However, when a law is ruled unconstitutional, it is understood that the government is called upon to refrain from applying it, and the Diet is requested to revise or abolish the law soon.
Evaluation of laws No Not applicable
Measures

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